Avoiding Trivia : The Role of Strategic Planning in American Foreign Policy

Strategic planning needs to be a more integral part of AmericaOCOs foreign policymaking.While thousands of troops are engaged in combat and homeland security concerns abound, long-term coordination of goals and resources would seem to be of paramount importance.A change in presidential administration brings the hope that strategic planning will play an elevated role in U.S. foreign policy. Can policy plannersOCoin the Pentagon, State Department, Treasury, NSC, and National Intelligence CouncilOCorise to the challenge? Indeed, is strategic planning a viable concept in 21st-century foreign policy? Thesecrucial questions guide this eye-opening book. After World War II, George Kennan became the State DepartmentOCOs first director of policy planning. Secretary of State George MarshallOCOs initial advice to Kennan was to OC avoid triviaOCO above all else, hence the title. In other words, donOCOt get bogged down in the details. Avoiding Trivia critically assesses the past, future, and potential future role and impact of long-term strategic planning in foreign policy.The contributors include many key figures from the past few decades of foreign policy and planningOCoe.g., Richard Haass was the director of policy planning at State during the first George W. Bush administration; David F. Gordon currently holds that post; Peter Feaver was a special adviser for strategic planning at the NSC. They provide authoritative insight on the difficulties and importance of thinking and acting in a coherent way for the long term.Contributors include Andrew Erdmann, Peter Feaver, Aaron Friedberg, David F. Gordon, Richard Haass, William Inboden, Bruce Jentleson, Steven Krasner, Jeffrey Legro, Daniel Twining, ThomasWright, and Amy Zegart

After World War II, George Kennan became the State Department's first director of policy planning. Secretary of State George Marshall's initial advice to Kennan: above all, "avoid trivia." Concentrate on the forest, not the trees, and don't lost sight of the big picture. Easier said than done. Avoiding Trivia critically assesses the past, future, and future role and impact of long-term strategic planning in foreign policy.

Strategic planning needs to be a more integral part of America's foreign policymaking. Thousands of troops are engaged in combat while homeland security concerns remain. In such an environment, long-term coordination of goals and resources would seem to be of paramount importance. But history tells us that such cohesiveness and coherence are tremendously difficult to establish, much less maintain. Can policy planners—in the Pentagon, the State Department, Treasury, NSC, and National Intelligence Council—rise to the challenge? Indeed, is strategic planning a viable concept in 21st century foreign policy? These crucial questions guide this eye-opening book.

The contributors include key figures from the past few decades of foreign policy and planning—individuals responsible for imposing some sort of order and strategic priority on foreign policy in a world that changes by the minute. They provide authoritative insight on the difficulties and importance of thinking and acting in a coherent way, for the long term.

Contributors: Andrew P. N. Erdmann, Peter Feaver, Aaron L. Friedberg, David F. Gordon, Richard N. Haass, William Inboden, Bruce W. Jentleson, Steven D. Krasner, Jeffrey W. Legro, Daniel Twining, Thomas Wright, Amy B. Zegart.

After World War II, George Kennan became the State Department's first director of policy planning. Secretary of State George Marshall's initial advice to Kennan: above all, "avoid trivia." Concentrate on the forest, not the trees, and don't lost sight of the big picture. Easier said than done. Avoiding Trivia critically assesses the past, future, and future role and impact of long-term strategic planning in foreign policy. Strategic planning needs to be a more integral part of America's foreign policymaking. Thousands of troops are engaged in combat while homeland security concerns remain. In such an environment, long-term coordination of goals and resources would seem to be of paramount importance. But history tells us that such cohesiveness and coherence are tremendously difficult to establish, much less maintain. Can policy planners—in the Pentagon, the State Department, Treasury, NSC, and National Intelligence Council—rise to the challenge? Indeed, is strategic planning a viable concept in 21st century foreign policy? These crucial questions guide this eye-opening book. The contributors include key figures from the past few decades of foreign policy and planning—individuals responsible for imposing some sort of order and strategic priority on foreign policy in a world that changes by the minute. They provide authoritative insight on the difficulties and importance of thinking and acting in a coherent way, for the long term. Contributors: Andrew P. N. Erdmann, Peter Feaver, Aaron L. Friedberg, David F. Gordon, Richard N. Haass, William Inboden, Bruce W. Jentleson, Steven D. Krasner, Jeffrey W. Legro, Daniel Twining, Thomas Wright, Amy B. Zegart. " After World War II, George Kennan became the State Department's first director of policy planning. Secretary of State George Marshall's initial advice to above all, ""avoid trivia."" Concentrate on the forest, not the trees, and don't lost sight of the big picture. Easier said than done. Avoiding Trivia critically assesses the past, future, and future role and impact of long-term strategic planning in foreign policy. Strategic planning needs to be a more integral part of America's foreign policymaking. Thousands of troops are engaged in combat while homeland security concerns remain. In such an environment, long-term coordination of goals and resources would seem to be of paramount importance. But history tells us that such cohesiveness and coherence are tremendously difficult to establish, much less maintain. Can policy plannersin the Pentagon, the State Department, Treasury, NSC, and National Intelligence Councilrise to the challenge? Indeed, is strategic planning a viable concept in 21st century foreign policy? These crucial questions guide this eye-opening book. The contributors include key figures from the past few decades of foreign policy and planningindividuals responsible for imposing some sort of order and strategic priority on foreign policy in a world that changes by the minute. They provide authoritative insight on the difficulties and importance of thinking and acting in a coherent way, for the long term. Andrew P. N. Erdmann, Peter Feaver, Aaron L. Friedberg, David F. Gordon, Richard N. Haass, William Inboden, Bruce W. Jentleson, Steven D. Krasner, Jeffrey W. Legro, Daniel Twining, Thomas Wright, Amy B. Zegart. " Pt. 1. Introduction -- The challenging future of strategic planning in foreign policy / Daniel W. Drezner -- pt. 2. Grand strategy and policy planning -- Planning for policy planning / Richard N. Haass -- A road map for American leadership in a changing world / David F. Gordon and Daniel Twining -- A "return to normalcy"? : the future of America's internationalism / Jeffrey W. Legro -- pt. 3. Reforming strategic planning -- An integrative executive branch strategy for policy planning / Bruce W. Jentleson -- Strengthening U.S. strategic planning / Aaron L. Friedberg -- A strategic planning cell on national security at the White House / Peter Feaver and William Inboden -- pt. 4. Limits and opportunities for strategic planning -- Why the best is not yet to come in policy planning / Amy B. Zegart -- Learning the right lessons from the 1940s / Thomas Wright -- Foreign policy planning through a private sector lens / Andrew P.N. Erdmann -- The garbage can framework for locating policy planning / Stephen D. Krasner "Critically assesses the past, future, and potential future role and impact of long-term strategic planning in foreign policy. Key figures from past decades of foreign policy and planning provide authoritative insight on the difficulties and importance of thinking and acting in a coherent way for the long term"--Provided by publisher.