Austria in the first Cold War, 1945-55 : the leverage of the weak / ter Bischof

The new Cold War History Series aims to make available to scholars and students the results of advanced research on the origins and the development of the Cold War and its impact on nations, alliances and regions at various levels of statecraft, and in areas such as diplomacy, security, economy, military and society. Volumes in the series range from detailed and original specialised studies, proceedings of conferences, to broader and more comprehensive accounts. Each work deals with individual themes and periods of the Cold War and each author or editor approaches the Cold War with a variety of narrative, analysis, explanation, interpretation and reassessments of recent scholarship. These studies are designed to encourage investigation and debate on important themes and events in the Cold War, as seen from both East and West, in an effort to deepen our understanding of this phenomenon and to place it in its context in world history. During the Kennedy years, American policy-makers considered French President, Charles de Gaulle, an obstruction within the Atlantic Alliance. Summoning a wide range of French and American archival sources as well as British and German materials, this book demonstrates that the structure and dynamics of the Franco-American relationship during this period were embedded in complex multilateral relationships within the Western Alliance. The book argues that differences between France and the United States during the early 1960s were the outcome of a series of mutually reinforcing security and economic problems, driven by domestic agendas, and shaped by differing conceptions about the containment of the Soviet Union and Germany. Dr. Mahan provides a subtle synthesis and definitive analysis of the key issues and events that generated conflict between Kennedy and de Gaulle: the Berlin crisis, British membership in the European Economic Community, a balance-of-payments disputes and nuclear sharing with NATO The four great powers occupied and controlled Austria after its liberation. Austrians were involved in Hitler's war crimes, yet Austrian diplomacy persuaded the world and its own population that Austria was a victim. While the Soviets concentrated on the economic exploitation of Austria, the Western powers feared a Communist takeover. American economic aid totalling $1.5 billion guaranteed the economic survival and political stability of Austria and `balanced off' the same amount in reparations extracted by the Soviets from their zone. At the height of Cold War tensions, Western observers considered Austria 'Europe's Korea'. The re-armament of Austria was initiated before the German one - Austria became a 'secret ally' of the West. After eight years of negotiations the Austrian treaty was concluded in May 1955. Shrewd bilateral Austrian diplomacy with Stalin's successors in the Kremlin led to the breakthrough and demonstrated that the weak had leverage in manoeuvring between the superpowers Front Matter....Pages i-xvii Introduction....Pages 1-6 The Austrians’ Role and Allied Planning during the Second World War....Pages 7-29 The Anglo-Soviet Cold War over Austria, 1945/6....Pages 30-51 The Creation of Austrian Foreign Policy, 1945/6....Pages 52-77 Austrian Economic Malaise: Soviet-American Cold War over Austria, 1946/7....Pages 78-103 In the Shadow of Germany: the Militarization of the Cold War in Austria, 1948–52....Pages 104-129 After Stalin’s Death: “Peaceful Coexistence” and the Conclusion of the Austrian Treaty, 1953–5....Pages 130-149 Conclusion....Pages 150-156 Back Matter....Pages 157-237

At the height of the Cold War in the early 1950s, the western powers worried that occupied Austria might become "Europe's Korea" and feared a Communist takeover. The Soviets exploited their occupation zone for maximum reparations. American economic aid guaranteed Austria's survival and economic reconstruction. Their military assistance turned Austria into a "secret ally" of the West. Austrian diplomacy played a vital role in securing the Austrian treaty in bilateral negotiations with Stalin's successors in the Kremlin demonstrating the leverage of the weak in the Cold War.

At the height of the first Cold War in the early 1950s, the Western powers worried that occupied Austria might become 'Europe's Korea' and feared a Communist takeover. The Soviets exploited their occupation zone for maximum reparations. American economic aid guaranteed Austria's survival and economic reconstruction. Their military assistance turned Austria into a 'secret ally' of the West. Austrian diplomacy played a vital role in securing the Austrian treaty in bilateral negotiations with Stalin's successors in the Kremlin demonstrating the leverage of the weak in the Cold War. This analysis of US policy toward Indonesian nationalism argues that Truman's support for independence was based on his Cold War priorities and not principled backing for self-determination. It reveals how Eisenhower's New Look led to a disastrous CIA-backed intervention in 1957-58 and propelled Indonesia toward the Soviet bloc. Exposing the extent of Australian influence on US policy, this account reveals how the personal prejudices of Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles undermined the notion of rational policymaking.