Auction Theory

Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory 's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field. \*The standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions \*Explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information \*Uses accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory Auction Theory is the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. The book develops the main concepts of auction theory from scratch in a self-contained and theoretically rigorous manner. It explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information through detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory. This book complements its superb presentation of auction theory with clear and concise proofs of all results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization. It provides discussions on auction-related subjects, including private value auctions; the Revenue Equivalence Principle; auctions with interdependent values; the Revenue Ranking (Linkage) Principle; mechanism design with interdependent values; bidding rings; multiple object auctions; equilibrium and efficiency with private values; and nonidentical objects. This book is essential reading for graduate students taking courses on auction theory, the economics of information, or the economics of incentives, as well as for any serious student of auctions. It will also appeal to professional economists or business analysts working in contract theory, experimental economics, industrial organization, and microeconomic theory. *The standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions*Explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information*Uses accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory Content: Preface , Pages ix-xi Introduction , Pages 1-10 2 - Private value auctions: A first look , Pages 13-28 3 - The revenue equivalence principle , Pages 29-36 4 - Qualifications and extensions , Pages 37-60 5 - Mechanism design , Pages 61-82 6 - Auctions with interdependent values , Pages 83-102 7 - The revenue ranking (“Linkage”) principle , Pages 103-110 8 - Asymmetries and other complications , Pages 111-124 9 - Efficiency and the English auction , Pages 125-140 10 - Mechanism design with interdependent values , Pages 141-150 11 - Bidding rings , Pages 151-162 12 - An introduction to multiple object auctions , Pages 165-177 13 - Equilibrium and efficiency with private values , Pages 179-197 14 - Some revenue considerations , Pages 199-207 15 - Sequential sales , Pages 209-222 16 - Nonidentical objects , Pages 223-234 17 - Multiple objects and interdependent values , Pages 235-250 Appendix A - Continuous distributions , Pages 253-257 Appendix B - Stochastic orders , Pages 259-263 Appendix C - Order statistics , Pages 265-268 Appendix D - Affiliated random variables , Pages 269-272 Appendix E - Some linear algebra , Pages 273-277 Appendix F - Games of incomplete information , Pages 279-282 Appendix G - Existence of equilibrium in first-price auctions , Pages 283-288 References , Pages 289-297 Index , Pages 299-303 Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field.

*The standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions
*Explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information
*Uses accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory We begin the formal analysis by considering equilibrium bidding behavior in the four common auction forms in an environment with independently and identically distributed private values.