Atlantis Lost: The American Experience with De Gaulle, 1958-1969 (Amsterdam University Press: American Studies)

During the 1960s, Charles de Gaulle’s greatest quarrel was with the Americans. The American attitude towards this forceful European leader was, however, an equally defining part of the dispute. In this riveting study of transatlantic international relations, Sebastian Reyn traces American responses to de Gaulle’s foreign policy from 1958 to 1969, concluding that how Americans judged de Gaulle depended largely on whether their politics leaned to the left or the right. Een fascinerend en vernieuwend relaas over de 'liaison dangereuse' in de transatlantische betrekkingen van het Frankrijk van de jaren zestig. Geschiedkundigen hebben ruim aandacht besteed aan de markante buitenlandpolitiek van Charles de Gaulle. Dat geldt niet voor de vaak felle reacties die hij losmaakte. Op grond van uitvoerig onderzoek in Amerikaanse archieven zijn de reacties in de Verenigde Staten op De Gaulle nu door Sebastian Reyn in kaart gebracht. Het resultaat is een fascinerend en vernieuwend relaas over de liaison dangereuse in de transatlantische betrekkingen van de jaren zestig. Het Amerikaans-Franse conflict ontstond mede door ideologische wrijving tussen liberaal Amerikaans leiderschap en een Franse buitenlandpolitiek van conservatieve snit. De Amerikaanse afwijzing van het gaullisme is te zien als een uiting van anti-europeanisme, zelfs van eurofobie. Sebastian Reyn is cum laude in de letteren gepromoveerd aan de Universiteit Leiden in 2007. Hij is topambtenaar bij het ministerie van Defensie. Eerder publiceerde hij over de geschiedenis van de Amerikaanse buitenlandse politiek: Allies or Aliens? George W. Bush and the Transatlantic Crisis in American Perspective (Zoetermeer: Atlantische Commissie, 2004). Bron: Flaptekst, uitgeversinformatie Summary: Contents: Part 1; Seperate Worlds, Different Visions. Chapter One: From The Atlantic To The Urals: De Gaulle's 'european' Europe And The United States As The Ally Of Ultimate Recourse. Chapter Two: The Atlantic 'community' In American Foreign Policy: An Ambiguous Approach To The Cold War Alliance. Part Ii - Dealing With De Gaulle. Chapter Three: Organizing The West: Eisenhower, Kennedy, And De Gaulle's 'tripartite' Memorandum Proposal, 1958-1962. Chapter Four: Of Arms And Men: Kennedy, De Gaulle, And Military-strategic Reform, 1961-1962. Chapter Five: Whose Kind Of 'europe'? Kennedy's Tug Of War With De Gaulle About The Common Market, 1961-1962. Chapter Six: The Clash: Kennedy And De Gaulle's Rejection Of The Atlantic Partnership, 1962-1963. Chapter Seven: The Demise Of The Last Atlantic Project: Lbj And De Gaulle's Attack On The Multilateral Force, 1963-1965. Chapter Eight: De Gaulle Throws Down The Gauntlet: Lbj And The Crisis In Nato, 1965-1967. Chapter Nine: Grand Designs Go Bankrupt. Conclusions. Sebastian Reyn. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 499-534) And Index. Contents: Part 1; Separate worlds, different visions. Chapter One: From the Atlantic to the Urals: De Gaulle's 'European' Europe and the United States as the ally of ultimate recourse. Chapter Two: The Atlantic 'Community' in American foreign policy: An ambiguous approach to the Cold War alliance. Part II - Dealing with De Gaulle. Chapter Three: Organizing the West: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and de Gaulle's 'Tripartite' memorandum proposal, 1958-1962. Chapter Four: Of Arms and Men: Kennedy, De Gaulle, and military-strategic reform, 1961-1962. Chapter Five: Whose kind of 'Europe'? Kennedy's tug of war with de Gaulle about the Common Market, 1961-1962. Chapter Six: The Clash: Kennedy and de Gaulle's Rejection of the Atlantic Partnership, 1962-1963. Chapter Seven: The demise of the last Atlantic project: LBJ and De Gaulle's attack on the multilateral force, 1963-1965. Chapter Eight: De Gaulle throws down the gauntlet: LBJ and the crisis in NATO, 1965-1967. Chapter Nine: Grand Designs Go Bankrupt. Conclusions Contents......Page 8 Acknowledgments......Page 10 Introduction......Page 12 CH1. Organizing the West: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and de Gaulle’s “Tripartite” Memorandum Proposal, 1958-1962......Page 26 CH2. Whose Kind of “Europe”? Kennedy’s Tug of War With de Gaulle About the Common Market, 1961-1962......Page 84 CH3. The Clash: De Gaulle’s Rejection of Kennedy’s Atlantic Partnership, 1962-1963......Page 142 CH4. The Demise of the Last Atlantic Project: LBJ and De Gaulle’s Attack on the Multilateral Force, 1963-1965......Page 196 CH5. De Gaulle Throws Down the Gauntlet: LBJ and the Crisis in NATO, 1965-1967......Page 250 CH6. Grand Designs Go Bankrupt: From Divergence to Accommodation, 1967-1969......Page 308 Conclusion. Atlantis Lost: The Reception of Gaullism in the United States......Page 356 Notes......Page 380 Bibliography......Page 500 Abbreviations......Page 536 Index of persons......Page 540 Curriculum vitae......Page 548 Organizing the West: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and de Gaulle's 'Tripartite' memorandum proposal, 1958-1962 Whose kind of 'Europe'? Kennedy's tug of war with de Gaulle about the Common Market, 1961-1962 The clash: Kennedy and de Gaulle's rejection of the Atlantic Partnership, 1962-1963 The demise of the last Atlantic project: LBJ and De Gaulle's attack on the multilateral force, 1963-1965 De Gaulle throws down the gauntlet: LBJ and the crisis in NATO, 1965-1967 Grand designs go bankrupt Atlantis lost: the reception of Gaullism in the United States. Unearths the vicissitudes of the relationship between General de Gaulle and American administrations in the 1958-69 period

An investigation of welfare retrenchment in Denmark and the Netherlands in 1982-1998.