Army, Empire, and Cold War : The British Army and Military Policy, 1945-1971

The veterans of the Fourteenth Army who fought in Burma between 1942 and 1945 called themselves 'the forgotten army'. But that appellation could equally well be applied to the whole of the British army after 1945. Histories of Britain's post-war defence policy have usually focused on how and why Britain acquired a nuclear deterrent. David French takes a new look at these policies by placing the army centre-stage. Drawing on archival sources that have hardly been used by historians, he shows how British governments tried to create an army that would enable them to maintain their position as a major world power at a time when their economy struggled to foot the bill. The result was a growing mismatch between the military resources that the government thought it could afford on the one hand, and a long list of overseas commitments, in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the Far East, that it was reluctant to surrender. The result was that the British created a Potemkin army, a force that had an outwardly impressive facade, but that in reality had only very limited war-fighting capabilities. Army, Empire, and Cold War will interest not only historians of the British army, but also those who are trying to understand Britain's role in the Cold War, and how and why the British came to surrender formal rule over their empire. MuPDF error: syntax error: invalid key in dict MuPDF error: syntax error: invalid key in dict MuPDF error: syntax error: invalid key in dict MuPDF error: syntax error: invalid key in dict MuPDF error: syntax error: invalid key in dict MuPDF error: syntax error: invalid key in dict MuPDF error: syntax error: invalid key in dict MuPDF error: syntax error: invalid key in dict MuPDF error: syntax error: invalid key in dict Cover 1 Contents 6 Acknowledgements 7 List of Abbreviations 8 Introduction 12 1. Policy-Making and Policy-Makers 23 2. The ‘New Model Army’ and the Cold War, 1945–1952 47 3. Service in the National Service Army 66 4. The British Army of the Rhine, Middle East Land Forces, and Conventional Deterrence: 1948 to 1956 93 5. Counter-Insurgency Operations, 1945 to 1956 120 6. ‘Fire Brigades’: Expeditionary Operations, 1945–1956 139 7. Duncan Sandys and the Creation of the All-Regular Army 159 8. ‘A Good Employer’? The All-Regular Army 183 9. The British Army of the Rhine’s Doctrine for Nuclear War 209 10. The British Army of the Rhine and the Nuclear Battlefield 228 11. ‘Village Cricket’: Expeditionary Operations, 1958–1966 253 12. The Army and the Withdrawal from East of Suez 279 Conclusion: A Potemkin Army 312 Bibliography 320 Index 336 A 336 B 336 C 337 D 338 E 339 F 339 G 339 H 340 I 340 J 340 K 341 L 341 M 341 N 342 O 342 P 342 Q 342 R 343 S 343 T 344 U 345 V 345 W 345 Z 346 There Is ... A Need For A New Narrative Of The History Of The [british] Army In The Two And A Half Decades After The Second World War ... This Book Will Try To Produce It By Placing The History Of The Post-war Army Within The Wider Context Of The British Strategic Culture, By Focusing On Its Ability To Achieve The Tasks That It Was Set By Successive Governments, And By Analysing Its Capacity To Generate Firing Power--introduction. Policy-making And Policy Makers -- The 'new Model Army And The Cold War 1945-1952 -- Service In The National Service Army -- The British Army Of The Rhine, Middle East Land Forces And Conventional Deterrence : 1948 To 1956 -- Counter Insurgency Operations, 1945-1956 -- Fire Brigades : Expeditionary Options, 1945-1956 -- Duncan Sandys And The Creation Of The All-regular Army -- A Good Employer? The All-regular Army -- The British Army Of The Rhine's Doctrine For Nuclear War -- The British Army Of The Rhine And The Nuclear Battlefield -- Village Cricket : Expeditionary Operations, 1958-1966 -- The Army And The Withdrawal From East Of Suez -- A Potemkin Army. David French. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [309]-324) And Index. The veterans of the Fourteenth Army who fought in Burma between 1942 and 1945 called themselves ‘the forgotten army’. But that appellation could equally well be applied to the whole of the British army after 1945. Histories of Britain's post‐war defence policy have usually focused on how and why Britain acquired a nuclear deterrent. This book takes a new look at it by placing the army centre‐stage. Drawing on archival sources that have hardly been used by historians, it shows how British governments tried to create an army that would enable them to maintain their position as a major world power at a time when their economy struggled to foot the bill. The result was a growing mismatch between the military resources that the government thought it could afford on the one hand, and a long list of overseas commitments, in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the Far East, that it was reluctant to surrender. The result was that the British created a Potemkin army, a force that had an outwardly impressive facade, but that in reality had only very limited war‐fighting capabilities David French takes a new look at Britain's post-war defence policy by placing the army centre-stage. He sheds new light on this critical period by drawing from a range of primary sources never before consulted by historians, and explains why we should remember the forgotten post-war British army.