Arms and Conflict in the Middle East (Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development)

This Study Contributes To The Debate On Whether Defense Spending Encourages Or Hinders Economic Growth. The Effect Of Politics On Economic Growth In Developing Societies Is Assessed, With A Focus On The Middle East. The Study Is The First To Add Conflict Variables To The Production Function Defense-growth Model And Test Them Empirically Across Countries And Regions, And Provide Robust Empirical Evidence On The Differential Effects Of Interstate And Intrastate Conflicts On Economic Growth. The Study Provides Compelling Empirical Evidence And Guidelines To Policy Decision Makers On How To Allocate The Resources Of Their States And Adopt Policies That Promote Political Economic Development. The Study Urges Third World Leaders To Improve Levels Of Freedom, Democracy, And Openness Of Their Political Systems Because The Results Confirm That Political Factors Are At Least As Important As Economic Factors In Promoting Economic Growth. Furthermore, The Results Attest That The Reallocation Of Resources From Military To The Civilian Sector Is The Sine Qua Non To Improve The Performance Of Developing Countries' Economies. Introduction -- The Political Economy Of The Middle East -- Arab Israeli Conflict -- Arms In The Middle East -- Theories And Models -- The Model -- Data And Estimation And Results -- Conclusion. Riad A. Attar. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 179-190) And Index. Arms and Conflict in the Middle East 4 Copyright page 5 Contents 6 List of figures 8 List of Tables 10 Foreword 12 Chapter 1. Introduction 14 1.1. The production function research program 14 1.2. The evolution of the production function 16 1.3. The political economy of defense 20 1.4. Combining politics and economics 20 1.5. The production function and developing countries 22 1.6. The impact of conflicts on economic growth 23 1.7. Organization of the book 24 Chapter 2. The political economy of the Middle East 28 2.1. Introduction 28 2.2. Evolution of the Middle East’s political economy 29 2.3. The umayyads and the abbasids 32 2.4. The ottomans 33 2.5. Contemporary Middle Eastern political economy 35 2.6. Structural approach to political system 38 2.7. Economic growth based on Easton’s model 40 2.8. Applying Easton’s framework to the Middle East 40 2.9. The indirect effect of conflicts 44 2.10. Shadow economies and sub-economies 44 Notes 46 Chapter 3. Arab Israeli conflict 48 3.1. Introduction 48 3.2. Bargaining 49 3.3. The model 52 3.4. Reservation levels 53 3.5. Who to believe? 58 3.6. United nations security council resolutions 242 and 338 60 3.7. The Camp David accords 61 3.8. Wadi Arab agreement 62 3.9. Camp David accords as pacta sunt servanda 65 3.10. Wadi araba agreement as pacta sunt servanda 67 3.11. Oslo accords 68 3.12. Oslo accords and the crisis of implementation 71 3.13. Lack of progress in the middle east peace process 72 3.14. Nested influence on Palestinian decision makers 73 3.15. The iron law of oligarchy and the Palestinian leadership 74 3.16. Palestinian democracy 75 Chapter 4. Arms in the middle east 78 4.1. Introduction 78 4.2. Richardson’s model and relevant studies 79 4.3. Empirical estimation of action-reaction model of the Middle East 81 4.4. North Africa 82 4.5. Front-line states and Israel 89 4.6. Israeli defense army 92 4.7. Jordanian survival policy 94 4.8. Syria from father to son 95 4.9. Pakistan and India 97 4.10. Gulf states 99 Notes 104 Chapter 5. Theories and models 106 5.1. Realism 107 5.2. Liberalism 109 5.3. Radicalism 110 5.4. Political economy of conflicts in developing countries 111 5.5. National sovereignty and defense 113 5.6. Mercantilism and defense 113 5.7. The physiocrats and defense 114 5.8. Adam Smith and defense 114 5.9. Political economy of defense 115 5.10. Arms race model 115 5.11. Incremental approach 117 5.12. Defense spending and economic growth 118 5.13. Contextual theory of production function defense-growth model 122 Note 126 Chapter 6. The model 128 Hypotheses 132 Chapter 7. Data and estimation and results 136 7.1. Economic data 136 7.2. Military data 137 7.3. Political data 138 7.4. Institutional and political freedoms 138 7.5. Regime type 139 7.6. Regime stability 140 7.7. Ideological base 140 7.8. Conflict variables 141 7.9. International and extra-systemic wars 141 7.10. Civil wars 142 7.11. Methods 142 7.12. Results 144 7.13. Summary of NLS results 145 7.14. Results of the cross-national time series analysis 157 Notes 178 Conclusion 180 8.1. Policy implications of the study 183 8.2. Effects of military and nonmilitary spending on economic growth 183 8.3. Disparity between defense spending and externalities 184 8.4. The structural approach and policy adjustment 184 8.5. The tragic state of investments in developing countries 186 8.6. The culture of death and economic growth in the middle east 190 References 192 Appendix A 204 Results of the non-linear least squares methods 204 Appendix B 254 Cross-national time series results with a single political or conflict variable 254 Appendix C 262 Cross-national time series analysis results with external and internal conflicts as control variables 262 Subject Index 266 9781849506618 A study that contributes to the debate on whether defense spending encourages or hinders economic growth. It assesses the effect of politics on economic growth in developing societies, with a focus on the Middle East. It urges Third World leaders to improve levels of freedom, democracy, and openness of their political systems.