Armies of Sand : The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness

Since the Second World War, Arab armed forces have consistently punched below their weight. They have lost many wars that by all rights they should have won, and in their best performances only ever achieved quite modest accomplishments. Over time, soldiers, scholars, and military experts have offered various explanations for this pattern. Reliance on Soviet military methods, the poor civil-military relations of the Arab world, the underdevelopment of the Arab states, and patterns of behavior derived from the wider Arab culture, have all been suggested as the ultimate source of Arab military difficulties.In__Armies of Sand__, Kenneth M. Pollack's powerful and riveting history of Arab armies from the end of World War Two to the present, assesses these differing explanations and isolates the most important causes. Over the course of the book, he examines the combat performance of fifteen Arab armies and air forces in virtually every Middle Eastern war, from the Jordanians and Syrians in 1948 to Hizballah in 2006 and the Iraqis and ISIS in 2014-2017. He then compares these experiences to the performance of the Argentine, Chadian, Chinese, Cuban, North Korean, and South Vietnamese armed forces in their own combat operations during the twentieth century. The book ultimately concludes that reliance on Soviet doctrine was more of a help than a hindrance to the Arabs. In contrast, politicization and underdevelopment were both important factors limiting Arab military effectiveness, but patterns of behavior derived from the dominant Arab culture was the most important factor of all. Pollack closes with a discussion of the rapid changes occurring across the Arab world-political, economic, and cultural-as well as the rapid evolution in warmaking as a result of the information revolution. He suggests that because both Arab society and warfare are changing, the problems that have bedeviled Arab armed forces in the past could dissipate or even vanish in the future, with potentially dramatic consequences for the Middle East military balance. Sweeping in its historical coverage and highly accessible, this will be the go-to reference for anyone interested in the history of warfare in the Middle East since 1945. Since the Second World War, Arab armed forces have consistently punched below their weight. They have lost many wars that by all rights they should have won, and in their best performances only ever achieved quite modest accomplishments. Over time, soldiers, scholars, and military experts have offered various explanations for this pattern. Reliance on Soviet military methods, the poor civil-military relations of the Arab world, the underdevelopment of the Arab states, and patterns of behavior derived from the wider Arab culture, have all been suggested as the ultimate source of Arab military difficulties. In Armies of Sand , Kenneth M. Pollack's powerful and riveting history of Arab armies from the end of World War Two to the present, assesses these differing explanations and isolates the most important causes. Over the course of the book, he examines the combat performance of fifteen Arab armies and air forces in virtually every Middle Eastern war, from the Jordanians and Syrians in 1948 to Hizballah in 2006 and the Iraqis and ISIS in 2014-2017. He then compares these experiences to the performance of the Argentine, Chadian, Chinese, Cuban, North Korean, and South Vietnamese armed forces in their own combat operations during the twentieth century. The book ultimately concludes that reliance on Soviet doctrine was more of a help than a hindrance to the Arabs. In contrast, politicization and underdevelopment were both important factors limiting Arab military effectiveness, but patterns of behavior derived from the dominant Arab culture was the most important factor of all. Pollack closes with a discussion of the rapid changes occurring across the Arab world-political, economic, and cultural-as well as the rapid evolution in warmaking as a result of the information revolution. He suggests that because both Arab society and warfare are changing, the problems that have bedeviled Arab armed forces in the past could dissipate or even vanish in the future, with potentially dramatic consequences for the Middle East military balance. Sweeping in its historical coverage and highly accessible, this will be the go-to reference for anyone interested in the history of warfare in the Middle East since 1945. Since The Second World War, Arab Armed Forces Have Consistently Punched Below Their Weight. They Have Lost Many Wars That By All Rights They Should Have Won, And In Their Best Performances Only Ever Achieved Quite Modest Accomplishments. Over Time, Soldiers, Scholars, And Military Experts Have Offered Various Explanations For This Pattern. Reliance On Soviet Military Methods, The Poor Civil-military Relations Of The Arab World, The Underdevelopment Of The Arab States, And Patterns Of Behavior Derived From The Wider Arab Culture, Have All Been Suggested As The Ultimate Source Of Arab Military Difficulties. Armies Of Sand, Kenneth M. Pollack's Powerful And Riveting History Of Arab Armies From The End Of World War Two To The Present, Assesses These Differing Explanations And Isolates The Most Important Causes. Over The Course Of The Book, He Examines The Combat Performance Of Fifteen Arab Armies And Air Forces In Virtually Every Middle Eastern War, From The Jordanians And Syrians In 1948 To Hizballah In 2006 And The Iraqis And Isis In 2014-2017. He Then Compares These Experiences To The Performance Of The Argentine, Chadian, Chinese, Cuban, North Korean, And South Vietnamese Armed Forces In Their Own Combat Operations During The Twentieth Century. The Book Ultimately Concludes That Reliance On Soviet Doctrine Was More Of A Help Than A Hindrance To The Arabs. In Contrast, Politicization And Underdevelopment Were Both Important Factors Limiting Arab Military Effectiveness, But Patterns Of Behavior Derived From The Dominant Arab Culture Was The Most Important Factor Of All. Pollack Closes With A Discussion Of The Rapid Changes Occurring Across The Arab World-political, Economic, And Cultural-as Well As The Rapid Evolution In War Making As A Result Of The Information Revolution. He Suggests That Because Both Arab Society And Warfare Are Changing, The Problems That Have Bedeviled Arab Armed Forces In The Past Could Dissipate Or Even Vanish In The Future, With Potentially Dramatic Consequences For The Middle East Military Balance. Sweeping In Its Historical Coverage And Highly Accessible, This Will Be The Go-to Reference For Anyone Interested In The History Of Warfare In The Middle East Since 1945. Since the Second World War, Arab armed forces have consistently punched below their weight. They have lost many wars that by all rights they should have won, and in their best performances only ever achieved quite modest accomplishments. Over time, soldiers, scholars, and military experts have offered various explanations for this pattern. Reliance on Soviet military methods, the poor civil-military relations of the Arab world, the underdevelopment of the Arab states, and patterns of behavior derived from the wider Arab culture, have all been suggested as the ultimate source of Arab military difficulties. In Armies of Sand, Kenneth M. Pollack assesses these differing explanations and isolates the most important causes. Over the course of the book, he examines the combat performance of fifteen Arab armies and air forces in virtually every Middle Eastern war, from the Jordanians and Syrians in 1948 to Hizballah in 2006 and the Iraqis and ISIS in 2014-2017. The book ultimately concludes that reliance on Soviet doctrine was more of a help than a hindrance to the Arabs. In contrast, politicization and underdevelopment were both important factors limiting Arab military effectiveness, but patterns of behavior derived from the dominant Arab culture was the most important factor of all. Pollack closes with a discussion of the rapid changes occurring across the Arab world, and suggests that because both Arab society and warfare are changing, the problems that have bedeviled Arab armed forces in the past could dissipate or even vanish in the future, with potentially dramatic consequences for the Middle East military balance. Sweeping in its coverage, this will be the go-to reference for anyone interested in the history of warfare in the Middle East since 1945. Introduction: The Six-Day War and the Mystery of Arab Military Ineffectiveness 1. Pattens of Arab Military Performance Part I: Soviet Doctrine2. The Soviet Way of War 3. Arab Militaries and Soviet Doctrine 4. North Korea, Cuba, and Soviet Doctrine Part II: Politicization5. Politicization 6. Arab Militaries and Politicization: Egypt 7. Arab Militaries and Politicization: Iraq 8. Politicization and the South Vietnamese Armed Forces 9. Politicization and the Argentine Armed Forces Part III: Underdevelopment10. Economic Development and Military Effectiveness 11. Economic Development and Syrian Military Effectiveness 12. Economic Development and the Libya-Chad Wars 13. Economic Development and Chinese Military Effectiveness 14. Economic Development and Arab Military Effectiveness Part IV: Culture 15. War and Culture 16. Arab Culture as an Explanation for Military Ineffectiveness 17. Aab Culture: Patterns and Predilections 18. Arab Culture and Arab Military Effectiveness 19. Arab Culture and Civilian Organizations 20. Culture and Education: The Causal Link 21. Arab Military Training Methods 22. Exceptional Arab Militaries: State Armed Forces 23. Exceptional Arab Militaries: Non-State Armies Conclusions: The Past, Present, and Future of Arab Military Effectiveness Notes Bibliography Armies Of Sand Asks, 'why Have Arab Militaries Fought So Poorly In The Modern Era?' It Examines The Performance Of Over Two-dozen Arab Militaries From 1948 To 2017, And Compares Them To A Half-dozen Non-arab Militaries, To Conclude That Politics, Economics, And Culture All Contributed To The Past Weakness Of Arab Armies.