Aristotle and Augustine on freedom : two theories of freedom, voluntary action, and akrasia

Aristotle and Augustine both hold that our beliefs in freedom and voluntary action are interdependent, and that voluntary actions can only be done for the sake of good. Hence Aristotle holds that no-one acts voluntarily in pursuit of evil; such actions would be inexplicable. Augustine, agreeing that such actions are inexplicable, still insists that they occur. This is the true place in Augustine's view of his "theory of will", and the real point of contrast between Aristotle and Augustine. In this text, the author takes up the suggestion made by J.L. Austin that the way to understand "free will", and Aristotle's discussion of freedom, is by seeking an understanding of what voluntary action is. This book makes the claim: that there are three conditions for voluntary action (namely, freedom from compulsion, from ignorance, and from irrationality) not two, as is usually held (namely, freedom from compulsion and from ignorance). The book also examines Aristotle's discussion of akrasia and reconsiders the contrast between Augustine and Aristotle, as well as focusing on Augustine as a philosopher of action. "Aristotle's and Augustine's famous discussions of freedom of action are more alike than has been recognized. Both are more concerned to describe freedom than to prove its existence. Both describe freedom of action by describing voluntary action. Both conclude that abandoning belief in freedom means abandoning belief in voluntary action too - which very few are willing to do." "Again, it is striking that both their descriptions of voluntary action show that voluntary actions must be: uncompelled; not ignorant; and done in pursuit of perceived attainable goods." "But don't agents sometimes act voluntarily in pursuit of perceived attainable evils? Aristotle says not: any such actions would be inexplicable as voluntary actions. Augustine, agreeing that such actions are inexplicable, still insists that they can occur. This - Dr Chappell argues - is the true place, in Augustine's theory of freedom, of his famous 'theory of will'. It is also the real point of contrast between Aristotle and Augustine."--Jacket Front Matter....Pages i-xii Front Matter....Pages 1-1 The Limits of the Voluntary....Pages 3-31 Freedom, Ability and Knowledge....Pages 32-54 Practical Reasoning....Pages 55-87 The Varieties of Akrasia....Pages 88-118 Front Matter....Pages 119-119 Voluntariness and Responsibility in Augustine....Pages 121-139 Voluntas and the Voluntary....Pages 140-153 The Good Will and the Good Life....Pages 154-175 Bad Will and the Mystery of Evil....Pages 176-207 Back Matter....Pages 208-213