Appointing Central Bankers: The Politics of Monetary Policy in the United States and the European Monetary Union (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

Focusing on how the President and the Senate influence monetary policy by appointing Federal Reserve Board members, this book answers three questions about the appointment process and its effects. First, do politicians influence monetary policy via Federal Reserve appointments? Second, who influences the process—only the President or the President and the Senate? Third, how is the structure of the Federal Reserve appointment process explained? The study extends the analysis of the Federal Reserve Board to the European Central bank. This Book Examines How The President And The Senate Influence Monetary Policy By Appointing Federal Reserve Members. The Book Answers Three Questions About The Appointment Process And Its Effects. First, Do Politicians Influence Monetary Policy Through Federal Reserve Appointments? Second, Who Influences The Process - The President Alone Or Both The President And The Senate? Third, What Explains The Structure Of The Federal Reserve Appointment Process? The Analysis Shows The Conditions Under Which The President Alone, Both The President And The Senate, Or Neither May Influence Monetary Policy With Federal Reserve Appointments. The Structure Of The Process Reflects Historical Political Battles Between The Democrats And Republicans Regarding The Centralization Of Authority To Set Monetary Policy Within The Federal Reserve System. The Study Extends The Analysis To The European Central Bank And Shows That The Federal Reserve Process Is More Representative Of Society Than The European Central Bank Process.--book Jacket. A Formal Model Of The Appointment Process -- Estimating Monetary Policy Preferences -- Empirically Testing The Model's Predictions -- Appointments To The European Central Bank -- The Origins Of The Federal Reserve Appointment Process -- Conclusions. Kelly H. Chang. Based On The Author's Thesis (doctoral)--stanford University. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 147-156) And Index. This book examines monetary policy by focusing on how the President and the Senate influence monetary policy by appointing Federal Reserve members. It attempts to answer three questions about the appointment process and its effects. First, do politicians influence monetary policy through Federal Reserve appointments? Second, who influences the process - the President alone or both the President and the Senate? Third, what explains the structure of the Federal Reserve appointment process? The test models show that the President alone, both the President and Senate, or neither, may influence monetary policy with Federal Reserve appointments. The structure of the process reflects political battles between the Democrats and Republicans regarding the centralization of authority to set monetary policy within the Federal Reserve System. The study extends the analysis to the European Central Bank and shows that the Federal Reserve process is more representative of society than the European Central Bank process. This book attempts to answer three questions. Do politicians influence monetary policy via Fed appointments? Who influences the process - the President alone or both the President and the Senate? What explains the structure of the Fed appointment process? Central banks are often independent, but the degree of independence varies among the banks and over time.