Appeasement in crisis ; From Munich to Prague, October 1938 - March 1939

After Munich, the British Government expressed readiness to defend what remained of Czechoslovakia. Six months later, Hitler ignored the warning and faced only verbal condemnation. A fortnight later, Chamberlain's Cabinet tried and failed to protect Poland by a similar 'guarantee'. Their deliberations show how and why they had so miscalculated. At Munich in September 1938, Britain and France had undertaken to arrange and international guarantee for what was left of Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile, the British Government would feel morally obliged to act as though the 'guarantee' were already in force. The worthlessness of this moral guarantee was exposed six months later when Germany organized the break-up of Czechoslovakia. Yet, 15 days after that, Britain went on to 'guarantee' Poland, pending a negotiated treaty. This, too, did not prevent the conquest and partition of Poland six months later. Why had Chamberlain's Cabinet believed this second guarantee would be any more effective than the first? Appeasement in Crisis shows that the answer to this question lies in the recorded exchanges among a small group of ministers, officials and service chiefs between October 1938 and March 1939 Front Matter....Pages i-viii Diplomacy by Guarantee....Pages 1-13 The Outlook from Whitehall....Pages 14-34 The Challenge of Barbarism....Pages 35-55 The Prospect of War....Pages 56-73 Resolving to Resist....Pages 74-94 Continental Commitment....Pages 95-115 The Challenge of Annexation....Pages 116-136 The Quest for Coalition....Pages 137-156 The Guaranteeing of Poland....Pages 157-177 Diplomacy by Drama....Pages 178-187 Back Matter....Pages 188-221