Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953 (Stanford Nuclear Age Series)

This book is a provocative, forcefully argued, and thoroughly documented reassessment of President Truman’s profound influence on U.S. foreign policy and the Cold War. The author contends that throughout his presidency, Truman remained a parochial nationalist who lacked the vision and leadership to move the United States away from conflict and toward détente. Instead, he promoted an ideology and politics of Cold War confrontation that set the pattern for successor administrations. This study sharply challenges the prevailing view of historians who have uncritically praised Truman for repulsing the Soviet Union. Based on exhaustive research and including many documents that have come to light since the end of the Cold War, the book demonstrates how Truman’s simplistic analogies, exaggerated beliefs in U.S. supremacy, and limited grasp of world affairs exacerbated conflicts with the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. For example, Truman’s decision at the Potsdam Conference to engage in “atomic poker” and outmaneuver the Soviets in Europe and Asia led him to brush aside all proposals to forgo the use of atomic bombs on Japan. Truman’s insecurity also reinforced his penchant to view conflict in black-and-white terms, to categorize all nations as either free or totalitarian, to demonize his opponents, and to ignore the complexities of historic national conflicts. Truman was unable to view China’s civil war apart from the U.S.-Soviet Cold War. Belittling critics of his support for the corrupt Guomindang government, he refused to negotiate with the emergent PRC. Though he did preserve South Korea’s independence after North Korea’s attack, he blamed the conflict solely on Soviet-inspired aggression, instead of a bitter dispute between two rival regimes. Truman’s decision to send troops across the 38th parallel to destroy the North Korean regime, combined with his disdain for PRC security concerns, brought about a tragic wider war. In sum, despite Truman’s claim to have “knocked the socks off the communists,” he left the White House with his presidency in tatters, military spending at a record high, McCarthyism rampant, and the United States on Cold War footing at home and abroad. Contents Preface Acknowledgments 1 Independence to Washington 2 First Encounters 3 Preparing for Peacemaking 4 A Stony Place: Potsdam 5 A Personal Declaration of Cold War 6 The Year of Decisions 7 The Die Is Cast 8 In Behalf of Europe: The Truman Doctrine, 1947-1952 9 The World Split in Two: The Marshall Plan and the Division of Europe 10 Cat on a Sloping Tin Roof: The Berlin Blockade, 1948-1949 11 ‘To Make the Whole World Safe for Jews”: Truman and Palestine-Israel 12 “Sand in a Rat Hole": Double Policy in China 13 Turning Point: Containment Comes to Korea 14 Rollback to Retreat: The Politics of War 15 Double Containment: America over Europe Divided 16 Conclusion: Truman and Another Such Victoryusion Notes Journol Abbreviations Preface Chapter 1 • Independence to Washington Chapter 2. First Encounters Choptar 3. Preparing for Peacemaking Chapter 4. A Stony Place Chapter 5. A Personal Declaration of Cold War Chapter 6. The Year of Decisions Chapter 7. The Die Is Cast Chapter 8. In Behalf of Europe Chapter 9. The World Split in Two Chapter 10. Cat on a Sloping Tin Roof Chapter 11 • "To Make the Whole World Safe for Jews" Chapter 12. "Sand in a Rat Hole" Chapter 13. Turning Point Chapter 14. Rollback to Retreat Chapter 15. Double Containment Chapter 16. Conclusion Bibliography Index

This major book is a critical revisionist portrait of Truman’s personal role in shaping U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. . . . The importance of the scholarship, the author’s careful voice of reasonable criticism, the lucid writing style-all should give the book a popular readership that reaches beyond the university and foreign policy publics.-J. Garry Clifford, University of Connecticut
At a moment in the early 2lst century when the choices in a new crisis seem simply black and white, this is precisely the kind of historical perspective we should have. Professor Offner has reopened a long overdue debate on Harry Truman-both on the man and his role in the origins of the Cold War. . . . [I]t certainly demands to be read and widely discussed.-Walter LaFeber, Cornell University and author of America, Russia and the Cold War