Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921, Volume 3: The Anglo-Soviet Accord (Center for International Studies, Princeton University (1))

In February 1920 the civil war that had ravaged Russia in the wake of the Bolshevik seizure of power was all but over, and with it the attempt of foreign governments to intervene on behlf of the anti-Communist forces. The government most deeply involved in this intervention was that of Great Britain. Yet scarcely a year later Britain was the first major power to come to terms with the new leadership in Moscow. Richard H. Ullman's account of that cautious coming to terms offers a perspective on the processes by which British foreign policy adjusted to the drastically changed circumstances of the aftermath of World War I. Another important theme is the way in which British policy, and the conceptions of peace and security that underlay it, diverged from that of Britain's closest ally, France. The book is, as well, a contribution of the growing literature on bureaucractic politics and the politics of foreign-policy making, and is a protracted essay on the statecraft and political style of David Lloyd George. It draws on many new sources, among them the interecepted and deciphered telegrams of the Soviet mission in London. Richard H. Ullman is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. The Anglo-Soviet Accord is the third and final volume of his Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1917-1921. Originally published in 1973. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905 In February 1920 the civil war that had ravaged Russia in the wake of the Bolshevik seizure of power was all but over, and with it the attempt of foreign governments to intervene on behalf of the anti-Communist forces. The government most deeply involved n this intervention was that of Great Britain. Yet scarcely a year later Britain was the first major power to come to terms with the new leadership in Moscow. Richard H. Ullman's account of that cautious coming to terms offers a perspective on the processes by which British foreign policy adjusted to the drastically changed circumstances of the aftermath of World War I. Another important theme is the way in which British policy, and the conceptions of peace and security that underlay it, diverged from that of Britain's closest ally, France. The book is, as well, a contribution to the growing literature on bureaucratic politics and the politics of foreign-policy making, and is a protracted essay on the statecraft and political style of David Lloyd George. It draws on many new sources, among them the intercepted and deciphered telegrams of the Soviet mission in London. Contents 13 Maps and Illustrations 15 Part One: Coming to Terms 17 Chapter I. Poland and Trade 19 Chapter II. Wrangel 76 Chapter III. Krasin 105 Part Two: The Polish-Soviet War 149 Chapter IV. Spa 151 Chapter V. Kamenev's Note 200 Chapter VI. Pilsudski's Victory and Kamenev's Deception 257 Chapter VII. The "Intercepts" 289 Part Three: The Anglo-Russian Rivalry in the East 339 Chapter VIII. The Rivalry Renewed 341 Chapter IX. Persia 373 Chapter X. The Trade Agreement 421 Chapter XI. Russia, Bolshevism, and the Statecraft of David Llyod George 478 Appendix 498 Selected Bibliography 507 Index 517 v. 1. Intervention and the war. v. 2. Britain and the Russian Civil War, Nov. 1918-Feb. 1920. v. 3. The Anglo-Soviet accord.