Analytic Theism: A Philosophical Investigation (Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Religion)

This book explores and develops a new philosophical argument for the existence of God from metaphysics. It focuses on exploring the pressing questions of God's existence, the truth of theistic belief, and its relevance in modern philosophy. In doing so, it bridges the discussions and debates in the field of contemporary metaphysics with that of analytic philosophy of religion. At its core, metaphysics is dedicated to unveiling the fundamental structure of reality, playing a critical role in any intellectual endeavour in the quest for truth. However, a noticeable gap has persisted between today's metaphysical conversations and the debates in analytic philosophy of religion, especially regarding the topic of God's existence. In this book, the author embarks on a rigorous exploration, presenting an innovative a posteriori argument for theism, rooted in the latest evidence and theories from contemporary metaphysics. The first part of the book details the explanatory framework of the analysis, which is focused on introducing a new abductive methodology within metaphysics that provides a way for assessing the veracity of theism and the leading fundamental theories in contemporary metaphysics. The second part of the book then focuses on demonstrating how the central concepts and theories within contemporary metaphysics-such as quantum foundations, four-dimensionalism, formal ontology, essentialism, grounding, powerful causation, mereology, free will, personhood, and the reality of suffering-are best explained by the existence of God, and thus justify theism, over that of the competing theories within contemporary metaphysics. Theism is thus the best working metaphysical theory and should take a central place in fundamental enquiries within the field of contemporary metaphysics and beyond. Analytic Theism: A Philosophical Investigation is a must-read for scholars and advanced students venturing into philosophy of religion and metaphysics. Beyond its appeal to those in analytic philosophy of religion and metaphysics, this work also resonates with those immersed in contemporary philosophy on a whole and related fields of inquiry, serving as a pivotal read for anyone keen on the intersections of philosophy, theology, and science. Cover Half Title Series Page Title Page Copyright Page Dedication Table of Contents Part 1: Explanatory Framework Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1 The Nature and Scope of Philosophy 1.2 The Nature and Scope of Metaphysics 1.2.1 The Nature of Metaphysics 1.2.2 The Scope of Metaphysics 1.3 The Nature and Scope of Philosophy of Religion 1.3.1 The Nature of Philosophy of Religion 1.3.2 The Scope of Philosophy of Religion 1.4 The Divide in Philosophy of Religion: Dual Approaches 1.4.1 Epistemological Divide 1.4.2 A Priori Natural Theology 1.4.3 A Posteriori Natural Theology 1.5 The Nature of Our Investigation: Evidentialist A Posteriori 1.6 The Plan of Action Notes Chapter 2: Explanatory Methodology—Abductive Framework 2.1 Introduction 2.2 The Nature of Explanation: Explanatory Forms 2.2.1 The Nature of General Explanation: General Explanatory Forms 2.2.2 The Nature of Metaphysical Explanation: The Metaphysical Pragmatic Account 2.3 The Justification of Explanation: Abductive Framework 2.3.1 The Nature of Abduction: Inferential Distinctions 2.3.2 The Nature of Abduction: Inference to the Loveliest Explanation 2.3.3 The Nature of Loveliness: Theoretical Virtues Systemisation 2.3.3.1 The Evidential Virtues 2.3.3.2 The Coherential Criterion 2.3.3.3 The Aesthetic Virtues 2.3.3.4 The Diachronic Virtues 2.3.4 The Nature of Loveliness: Metaphysical Modifications 2.3.5 The Abductive Criteria: A Reformulation 2.3.6 IBE: Metaphysical Application 2.4 Conclusion Notes Chapter 3: Preliminary Inferential Analysis (i)—Logically Compatible Candidates 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Inferential Analysis Stage One: Primary Framework 3.2.1 The Nature of Inferential Analysis Stage One 3.2.2 The Nature of Metaphysical Answer (A.1): Metaphysical Foundationalism 3.3 Inferential Analysis Stage One: Alternative Frameworks 3.3.1 The Nature of Metaphysical Answer (A.2): Metaphysical Flatworldism 3.3.1.1 Metaphysical Flatworldism Theoretical Issue (i): Explanatory Problem 3.3.1.2 Metaphysical Flatworldism Theoretical Issue (ii): Aesthetic Problem 3.3.2 The Nature of Metaphysical Answers (A.3) and (A.4): Metaphysical Infinitism and Coherentism 3.3.2.1 Metaphysical Infinitism and Coherentism Theoretical Issues (i): Explanatory Problem 3.3.2.2 Metaphysical Infinitism and Coherentism Theoretical Issues (ii): Aesthetic Problem 3.4 Conclusion Notes Chapter 4: Preliminary Inferential Analysis (ii)—Plausible Explanatory Candidates 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Inferential Analysis Stage Two: Internal Assessment Monistic Foundationalism 4.2.1 The Nature of Inferential Analysis Stage Two 4.2.2 Candidate Theory (i): Trope-Theoretic Theism 4.2.2.1 The Nature of Trope-Theoretic Theism Trope-Theoretic Framework 4.2.2.2 Governing Principles: Axiological Principles 4.2.2.3 Reasons in Support of Trope-Theoretic Theism 4.2.2.3.1 Reasons in Support (i): Regularity, Spatial Order and Fine-Tuning 4.2.2.3.2 Reasons in Support (ii): Religious Experience 4.2.2.4 Internal Assessment of Trope-Theoretic Theism 4.2.2.4.1 Internal Assessment: Criterion of Coherence 4.2.2.4.2 Internal Assessment: Criterion of Theoretical Commitments and Criterion of Unification 4.2.3 Candidate Theory (ii): Monistic Substantivalism 4.2.3.1 The Nature of Monistic Substantivalism 4.2.3.2 Governing Principle: Fundamentality Principles 4.2.3.3 Reasons in Support of Monistic Substantivalism 4.2.3.3.1 Reason in Support (i): Simplicity and Harmony 4.2.3.3.2 Reason in Support (ii): Monopolisation 4.2.3.4 Internal Assessment of Monistic Substantivalism 4.2.3.4.1 Internal Assessment: Criterion of Coherence 4.2.3.4.2 Internal Assessment: Criterion of Theoretical Commitments and Criterion of Unification 4.2.4 Candidate Theory (iii): Pure Stuff Theory 4.2.4.1 The Nature of Pure Stuff Theory 4.2.4.2 Governing Principles: Ontological Principles 4.2.4.3 Reasons in Support of Pure Stuff Theory 4.2.4.3.1 Reasons in Support (i): Common Sense and Language Use 4.2.4.3.2 Reasons in Support (ii): Material Constitution 4.2.4.4 Internal Assessment of Pure Stuff Theory 4.2.4.4.1 Internal Assessment: Criterion of Coherence 4.2.4.4.2 Internal Assessment: Criterion of Theoretical Commitments and Criterion of Unification 4.3 Inferential Analysis Stage Two: Internal Assessment—Pluralistic Foundationalism 4.3.1 Candidate Theory (iii): Mereological Bundle Theory 4.3.1.1 The Nature of Mereological Bundle Theory 4.3.1.2 Governing Principles: Mereological Principles 4.3.1.3 Reasons in Support of Mereological Bundle Theory 4.3.1.3.1 Reasons in Support (i): Simplicity, Flexibility, and Clarification 4.3.1.3.2 Reasons in Support (ii): Scientific Practice 4.3.1.4 Internal Assessment of Mereological Bundle Theory 4.3.1.4.1 Internal Assessment: Criterion of Coherence 4.3.1.4.2 Internal Assessment: Criterion of Theoretical Commitments and Unification 4.3.2 Candidate Theory (iv): Extended Simples Theory 4.3.2.1 The Nature of Extended Simples Theory 4.3.2.2 Governing Principles: Geometric Principles 4.3.2.3 Reasons in Support of Extended Simples Theory 4.3.2.3.1 Reasons in Support (i): Simplicity and Unity 4.3.2.3.2 Reasons in Support (ii): Scientific Practice 4.3.2.4 Internal Assessment of Extended Simple Theory 4.3.2.4.1 Internal Assessment: Criterion of Coherence 4.3.2.4.2 Internal Assessment: Criterion of Theoretical Commitments and Criterion of Unification 4.3.3 Candidate Theory (v): Priority-Based Structural Realism 4.3.3.1 The Nature of Priority-Based Structural Realism 4.3.3.2 Governing Principles: Relational Principles 4.3.3.3 Reasons in Support of Priority-Based Structural Realism 4.3.3.3.1 Reasons in Support (i): Coherence and Simplicity 4.3.3.3.2 Reasons in Support (ii): Underdetermination and Theoretical 4.3.3.4 Internal Assessment of Priority-Based Structural Realism 4.3.3.4.1 Internal Assessment: Criterion of Coherence 4.3.3.4.2 Internal Assessment: Criterion of Theoretical Commitments and Criterion of Unification 4.4 Conclusion Notes Part 2: Explanatory Analysis Chapter 5: Physical Reality—The Foundations of Quantum Mechanics 5.1 Introduction 5.2 The Nature of Metaphysical Evidence (A): Physical Reality 5.3 The Nature of the Wave Function Realism and the Copenhagen Interpretation 5.3.1 The Nature of Quantum Mechanics: Basic Formalism (i) 5.3.2 The Nature of Wave Function Realism: The Ontological Problem 5.3.3 The Nature of the Quantum: Basic Formalism (ii) 5.3.4 The Nature of the Copenhagen Interpretation: The Measurement Problem 5.4 Reasons in Support of Wave Function and Copenhagen Interpretation 5.4.1 Reasons from Primary Considerations 5.4.2 Reasons from Separability, Locality, and Entanglement 5.4.3 Reasons from Simplicity 5.5 External Assessment of Candidates: Explanatory Power 5.5.1 Introducing the Fundamentality Principles 5.5.2 The Non-fundamentality of Phenomena 5.5.3 External Assessment of Central Theory: Theism 5.5.3.1 Explanatory Compatibility of Theory 5.5.3.2 Explanatory Adequacy of Governing Principles 5.5.4 External Assessment of Alternative Metaphysical Candidate (i): Monistic Substantivalism 5.5.4.1 Explanatory Incompatibility of Theory 5.5.4.2 Explanatory Inadequacy of Governing Principles 5.5.5 External Assessment of Alternative Metaphysical Candidate (ii): Pure Stuff Theory 5.5.5.1 Explanatory Incompatibility of Theory 5.5.5.2 Explanatory Inadequacy of Governing Principles 5.5.6 External Assessment of Alternative Metaphysical Candidate (iii): Mereological Bundle Theory 5.5.6.1 Explanatory Incompatibility of Theory 5.5.6.2 Explanatory Inadequacy of Governing Principles 5.5.7 External Assessment of Alternative Metaphysical Candidate (iv): Extended Simples Theory 5.5.7.1 Explanatory Incompatibility of Theory 5.5.7.2 Explanatory Inadequacy of Governing Principles 5.5.8 External Assessment of Alternative Metaphysical Candidate (v): Priority-Based Structural Realism 5.5.8.1 Explanatory Incompatibility of Theory 5.5.8.2 Explanatory Inadequacy of Governing Principles 5.6 Conclusion Notes Chapter 6: Temporal Reality—Four-Dimensionalism 6.1 Introduction 6.2 The Nature of Metaphysical Evidence (B): Relational Reality 6.3 The Nature of Temporal and Persistence Four-Dimensionalism 6.3.1 The Nature of Temporal Four-Dimensional Reality 6.3.2 The Nature of Persistence Four-Dimensional Reality 6.4 Reasons in Support of Four-Dimensionalism 6.4.1 Reasons from Past-Tense Truthmakers 6.4.2 Reasons from Special Theory of Relativity 6.4.3 Reasons from Vagueness 6.4.4 Reasons from Temporary Intrinsics (i) 6.4.5 Reasons from Temporary Intrinsics (ii) 6.5 External Assessment of Candidates: Explanatory Power 6.5.1 The Non-fundamentality of Phenomena 6.5.2 External Assessment of Central Theory: Theism 6.5.2.1 Explanatory Compatibility of Theory 6.5.2.2 Evidential Adequacy of Governing Principles 6.5.3 External Assessment of Alternative Metaphysical Candidates (i): Monistic Substantivalism 6.5.3.1 Explanatory Incompatibility of Theory 6.5.3.2 Explanatory Inadequacy of Governing Principles 6.5.4 External Assessment of Alternative Metaphysical Candidates (ii): Pure Stuff Theory 6.5.4.1 Explanatory Incompatibility of Theory 6.5.4.2 Explanatory Inadequacy of Governing Principles 6.5.5 External Assessment of Alternative Metaphysical Candidates (iii): Mereological Bundle Theory 6.5.5.1 Explanatory Incompatibility of Theory 6.5.5.2 Explanatory Inadequacy of Governing Principles 6.5.6 External Assessment of Alternative Metaphysical Candidates (iv): Extended Simples Theory 6.5.6.1 Explanatory Incompatibility of Theory 6.5.6.2 Explanatory Inadequacy of Governing Principles 6.5.7 External Assessment of Alternative Metaphysical Candidates (v): Priority-Based Structural Realism 6.5.7.1 Explanatory Incompatibility of Theory 6.5.7.2 Explanatory Inadequacy of Governing Principles 6.6 Conclusion Notes Chapter 7: Ontological Reality—Categories and Essences 7.1 Introduction 7.2 The Nature of Metaphysical Evidence (C): Ontological Reality 7.3 The Nature of Categories and Essences 7.3.1 The Nature of Categories 7.3.2 The Nature of Essence 7.4 Reasons in Support of Affirming Categories and Essences 7.4.1 Reasons from Dispositional and Occurrent 7.4.2 Reasons from Property Dependence and Perception 7.4.3 Reasons from Natural Laws and Individuation 7.4.4 Reasons from Identity 7.4.5 Reasons from Modality 7.5 External Assessment of Candidates: Explanatory Power 7.5.1 The Non-fundamentality of Phenomena 7.5.2 External Assessment of Central Theory: Theism 7.5.2.1 Explanatory Compatibility of Theory 7.5.2.2 Explanatory Adequacy of Governing Principles 7.5.3 External Assessment of Alternative Metaphysical Candidate (i): Monistic Substantivalism 7.5.3.1 Explanatory Incompatibility of Theory 7.5.3.2 Explanatory Inadequacy of Governing Principles 7.5.4 External Assessment of Alternative Metaphysical Candidate (ii): Pure Stuff Theory 7.5.4.1 Explanatory Incompatibility of Theory 7.5.4.2 Explanatory Inadequacy of Governing Principles 7.5.5 External Assessment of Alternative Metaphysical Candidate (iii): Mereological Bundle Theory 7.5.5.1 Explanatory Compatibility of Theory 7.5.5.2 Explanatory Inadequacy of Governing Principles 7.5.6 External Assessment of Alternative Metaphysical Candidate (iv): Extended Simples Theory 7.5.6.1 Explanatory Incompatibility of Theory 7.5.6.2 Explanatory Inadequacy of Governing Principles 7.5.7 External Assessment of Alternative Metaphysical Candidate (v): Priority-Based Structural Realism 7.5.7.1 Explanatory Incompatibility of Theory 7.5.7.2 Explanatory Inadequacy of Governing Principles 7.6 Conclusion Notes Chapter 8: Relational Reality—Grounding and Powerful Qualities 8.1 Introduction 8.2 The Nature of Metaphysical Evidence (D): Relational Reality 8.3 The Nature of Grounding and Powerful Qualities 8.3.1 The Nature of Grounding (i): Initial Characterisation 8.3.2 The Nature of Existence Grounding: Directed-Dependence 8.3.3 The Nature of Identity Grounding: Identity-dependence 8.3.4 The Possible Primitiveness of Grounding 8.3.5 The Nature of Powerful Qualities: Dual-Nature 8.3.6 The Nature of Powerful Qualities: Powerful Causation 8.4 Reasons in Support of Affirming Grounding and Powerful Qualities 8.4.1 Reasons from the Role of Explanation 8.4.2 Reasons from Paradigm Examples 8.4.3 Reasons from Causation 8.4.4 Reasons from Biology 8.5 External Assessment of Candidates: Explanatory Power 8.5.1 The Non-fundamentality of Phenomena 8.5.2 External Assessment of Central Theory: Theism 8.5.2.1 Explanatory Compatibility of Theory 8.5.2.2 Explanatory Adequacy of Governing Principles 8.5.3 External Assessment of Alternative Metaphysical Candidate (i): Monistic Substantivalism 8.5.3.1 Explanatory Incompatibility of Theory 8.5.3.2 Explanatory Inadequacy of Governing Principles 8.5.4 External Assessment of Alternative Metaphysical Candidate (ii): Pure Stuff Theory 8.5.4.1 Explanatory Incompatibility of Theory 8.5.4.2 Explanatory Inadequacy of Governing Principles 8.5.5 External Assessment of Alternative Metaphysical Candidate (iii): Mereological Bundle Theory 8.5.5.1 Explanatory Incompatibility of Theory 8.5.5.2 Explanatory Inadequacy of Governing Principles 8.5.6 External Assessment of Alternative Metaphysical Candidate (iv): Extended Simples Theory 8.5.6.1 Explanatory Incompatibility of Theory 8.5.6.2 Explanatory Inadequacy of Governing Principles 8.5.7 External Assessment of Alternative Metaphysical Candidate (v): Priority-Based Structural Realism 8.5.7.1 Explanatory Incompatibility of Theory 8.5.7.2 Explanatory Inadequacy of Governing Principles 8.6 Conclusion Notes Chapter 9: Personal Reality—Objects, Persons, and Freedom 9.1 Introduction 9.2 The Nature of Metaphysical Evidence (E): Personal Reality 9.3 The Nature of Objects, Persons, and Freedom 9.3.1 The Nature of Objects: The Neo-Aristotelian Thesis 9.3.2 The Nature of Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism 9.3.3 The Nature of Personhood 9.3.4 The Nature of Libertarianism 9.4 Reasons in Support of Objects, Persons, and Freedom 9.4.1 Reasons from Grounding Problem and Intuitive Plausibility 9.4.2 Reasons from Unity and Mental Causation 9.4.3 Reasons for Uniqueness of Self-Awareness and Diachronic Personal Identity 9.4.4 Reasons from Moral Responsibility and Luck 9.5 External Assessment of Candidates: Explanatory Power 9.5.1 The Non-fundamentality of Phenomena 9.5.2 External Assessment of Central Theory: Theism 9.5.2.1 Explanatory Compatibility of Theory 9.5.2.2 Explanatory Adequacy of Governing Principles 9.5.3 External Assessment of Alternative Metaphysical Candidate (i): Monistic Substantivalism 9.5.3.1 Explanatory Incompatibility of Theory 9.5.3.2 Explanatory Inadequacy of Governing Principles 9.5.4 External Assessment of Alternative Metaphysical Candidate (ii): Pure Stuff Theory 9.5.4.1 Explanatory Incompatibility of Theory 9.5.4.2 Explanatory Inadequacy of Governing Principles 9.5.5 External Assessment of Alternative Metaphysical Candidate (iii): Mereological Bundle Theory 9.5.5.1 Explanatory Incompatibility of Theory 9.5.5.2 Explanatory Inadequacy of Governing Principles 9.5.6 External Assessment of Alternative Metaphysical Candidate (iv): Extended Simples Theory 9.5.6.1 Explanatory Incompatibility of Theory 9.5.6.2 Explanatory Inadequacy of Governing Principles 9.5.7 External Assessment of Alternative Metaphysical Candidate (v): Priority-Based Structural Realism 9.5.7.1 Explanatory Incompatibility of Theory 9.5.7.2 Explanatory Inadequacy of Governing Principles 9.6 Conclusion Notes Chapter 10: Experiential Reality (i)—Suffering 10.1 Introduction 10.2 The Nature of Metaphysical Evidence (F): Experiential Reality 10.3 The Nature of Suffering 10.3.1 The Nature of Suffering: The Desire Account 10.3.2 The Problem of Suffering: An Evidential Challenge 10.3.3 The Nature of Theodicy: The Greater Good Theodicy 10.4 Exemplarism and Transformative Experience 10.4.1 The Nature of Exemplarism 10.4.2 The Incompatibility and Unexpectedness of the Hypothesis of Indifference 10.4.3 The Compatibility and Expectedness of Trope-Theoretic Theism 10.4.4 The Nature of Transformative Experiences 10.4.5 The Incompatibility and Unexpectedness of the Hypothesis of Indifference 10.4.6 The Compatibility and Expectedness of Trope-Theoretic Theism 10.5 Transforming into an Exemplar 10.5.1 The Nature of Exemplar Transformative Experiences: Epistemic and Personal 10.5.2 The Relationship between Suffering and Exemplarity: Virtue of Wisdom 10.5.3 The Relationship between Suffering and Exemplarity: Virtues of Courage and Morality 10.5.4 The Relationship between Suffering and Exemplarity: A Motivating Factor 10.5.5 Suffering and an Exemplary Greater Good (i) 10.5.6 The Nature of the Severity Objection 10.6 Conclusion Notes Chapter 11: Experiential Reality (ii)—Gratuitous Suffering 11.1 Introduction 11.2 The Nature of the Gratuitous Objection 11.3 The Nature of the Gratuitous Objection: Animal Exemplarism 11.3.1 Animals as Persons 11.3.2 Animals as Moral Subjects 11.3.3 Animals as Exemplars of Morality 11.4 The Nature of Compensation 11.4.1 The Nature of Compensation: Definition 11.4.2 The Nature of Connections: ACI 11.5 Compensated Suffering 11.5.1 Compensation for Suffering via Infinitely Valuable Connections 11.5.2 Suffering and an Exemplary Greater Good (ii) 11.5.3 The End of the A Posteriori Investigation 11.6 Conclusion Notes Chapter 12: Conclusion 12.1 Summary of Investigation 12.2 Concluding Outcomes Bibliography Index