Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought (Modern European Philosophy)

This 2007 book examines the possibilities for the rehabilitation of Hegelian thought within analytic philosophy. From its inception, the analytic tradition has in general accepted Bertrand Russell's hostile dismissal of the idealists, based on the claim that their metaphysical views were irretrievably corrupted by the faulty logic that informed them. These assumptions are challenged by the work of such analytic philosophers as John McDowell and Robert Brandom, who, while contributing to core areas of the analytic movement, nevertheless have found in Hegel sophisticated ideas that are able to address problems which still haunt the analytic tradition after a hundred years. Paul Redding traces the consequences of the displacement of the logic presupposed by Kant and Hegel by modern post-Fregean logic, and examines the developments within twentieth-century analytic philosophy which have made possible an analytic re-engagement with a previously dismissed philosophical tradition. COVER......Page 1 HALF-TITLE......Page 3 SERIES-TITLE......Page 5 TITLE......Page 7 COPYRIGHT......Page 8 CONTENTS......Page 9 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS......Page 11 INTRODUCTION: ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE FALL AND RISE OF THE KANT–HEGEL TRADITION......Page 13 1 McDOWELL, SELLARS AND THE MYTH OF THE PERCEPTUALLY GIVEN......Page 33 1.1 Sellars’s critique of the myth of the given......Page 34 1.2 Kantian ‘intuition’ as a demonstrative concept......Page 41 1.3 Reinterpreting Frege and Russell, with Evans......Page 46 1.4 With Evans to Kant......Page 57 1.5 From Evans to Hegel......Page 62 2 BRANDOM, SELLARS AND THE MYTH OF THE LOGICAL GIVEN......Page 68 2.1 Russell and the myth of the logical given......Page 71 2.2 Sellars and the critique of logical intuition......Page 74 2.3 Rule-following and material inference......Page 81 2.4 Brandom’s pragmatics for reason-giving language games......Page 85 2.5 Inferentialism and the problems of perception......Page 91 3 INDIVIDUATION AND DETERMINATE NEGATION IN KANT AND HEGEL......Page 97 3.1 Kant and modern logic......Page 98 3.2 Intuitions, individuals and the singular-particular distinction......Page 101 3.3 Kant’s ambiguous conception of the nature of intuition......Page 105 3.4 Hegel on determinacy and givenness......Page 113 3.5 Kant, Hegel and the world as a determinable interactive whole......Page 118 4 THE KANTIAN ROUTE TO HEGEL’S INFERENTIALISM......Page 127 4.1 The syllogistic deep structure of Kantian judgements......Page 128 4.2 The positive role of inferential reason in Kant’s critical philosophy......Page 134 4.3 Inference and Kant’s interactionist worldview......Page 144 4.4 Kantian reason and rational interaction......Page 150 5 ARISTOTELIAN PHRONESIS AND THE PERCEPTUAL DISCERNMENT OF VALUE......Page 157 5.1 The problem of value judgements......Page 163 5.2 Phronesis and Kantian moral psychology......Page 167 5.3 Kant and the fate of Hutchesonian ‘moral sensibilism’......Page 173 5.4 Reflective judgement and aesthetic community......Page 178 5.5 The pre-Socratic origins of Aristotle’s evaluative polarities......Page 183 6 KANT, HEGEL AND THE DYNAMICS OF EVALUATIVE REASON......Page 187 6.1 Reasoning about value......Page 188 6.2 Hegel on the logic of evaluative judgement......Page 193 6.3 Kant and Hegel on the logic of evaluative reasoning......Page 201 6.4 The Hegelian shapes of subjective reason......Page 206 6.5 Logic and ontology......Page 210 7 HEGEL AND CONTRADICTION......Page 212 7.1 Negation and the laws of non-contradiction......Page 216 7.2 Epistemic opposition and reflection......Page 223 8 HEGEL, ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE QUESTION OF METAPHYSICS......Page 232 8.1 Hegel as critic of ‘metaphysical positivism’......Page 235 8.2 Naturalism and the possibility of philosophy after metaphysical positivism......Page 241 BIBLIOGRAPHY......Page 249 INDEX......Page 257 Examines the possibilities for the rehabilitation of Hegelian thought within current analytic philosophy. From its inception, the analytic tradition has in general accepted Bertrand Russell's hostile dismissal of the idealists, based on the claim that their metaphysical views were irretrievably corrupted by the faulty logic that informed them. But these assumptions are challenged by the work of such analytic philosophers as John McDowell and Robert Brandom, who while contributing to core areas of the analytic movement, nevertheless have found in Hegel sophisticated ideas that are able to address problems which still haunt the analytic tradition after a hundred years. Paul Redding traces the consequences of the displacement of the logic presupposed by Kant and Hegel by modern post-Fregean logic, and examines the developments within twentieth-century analytic philosophy which have made possible an analytic re-engagement with a previously dismissed philosophical tradition. Introduction : Analytic Philosophy And The Fall And Rise Of The Kant-hegel Tradition -- Mcdowell, Sellars And The Myth Of The Perceptually Given -- Brandom, Sellars And The Myth Of The Logical Given. Individuation And Determinate Negation In Kant And Hegel -- The Kantian Route To Hegel's Inferentialism -- Aristotelian Phronesis And The Perceptual Discernment Of Value -- Kant, Hegel And The Dynamics Of Evaluative Reason -- Hegel And Contradiction -- Hegel, Analytic Philosophy And The Question Of Metaphysics. Paul Redding. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 237-244) And Index. Paul Redding examines the possibilities for the rehabilitation of Hegelian thought within current analytic philosophy