Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium (Publications of the ... Wittgenstein Society – New Series, 23)

The divide between “analytic” and “continental” philosophy has occupied a central place in the meta-philosophical discourse of the 20th and 21st century. This volume collects contributions from leading philosophers whose work is in some way impacted by the divide. While some of them tackle the issue in a straightforward manner, others focus on concrete problems in relation to which meta-philosophical differences actually do matter. Introduction 1 Wittgenstein Peter Hacker Can You Have My Pain? 11 Martin Kusch Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and Relativism 29 Christian Helmut Wenzel Wittgenstein and Free Will 47 Joachim Schulte Wittgenstein’s Last Writings 63 Metaphilosophy and Methodology Dan Zahavi Analytic and Continental Philosophy: From Duality Through Plurality to (Some Kind of) Unity 79 Charles Siewert For Analytic Phenomenology 95 Steve Fuller Towards a New Foundationalist Turn in Philosophy: Transcending the Analytic-Continental Divide 111 Guillaume Fréchette Two Phenomenological Accounts of Intuition 129 Julia Jansen Imagination and 4E Cognition: An Analytic-Continental Exchange 143 Thorsten Streubel Intuition und Argumentation – zum Verhältnis von intuitiver und diskursiver Vernunft 157 Uwe Meixner Truth against Reason, and Reason against Truth 173 Philosophy of Mind Jan Slaby Don’t beep me, bro’! – A Worry About Introspection 187 James N. McGuirk Metaphysical and Phenomenological Perspectives on Habituality and the Naturalization of the Mind 203 Thomas Fuchs Embodied Knowledge – Embodied Memory 215 Michel Bitbol Panpsychism in the First Person 231 Karl Mertens What Is It Like to Be an Angel? The Importance of Corporeally-Situated Experience for Our Concept of Action 247 Social Philosophy and Collective Intentionality Thomas Szanto Do Group Persons have Emotions – or Should They? 261 Alessandro Salice Collective Intentionality and the Collective Person in Max Scheler 277 Being Well Together – Aristotle on Joint Activity and Common Sense 289 Michela Summa Pretence and the Inner. Reflections on Expressiveness and the Experience of Self and Other 309 Hanne Jacobs Socialization, Reflection, and Personhood 323 Robert Hugo Ziegler ‘Vaulting Ambition’ – Machiavelli’s Emtpy and Impure Concepts 337 Ethics and Value Theory Marcia Baron The Distinction between Objective and Subjective Standards in the Criminal Law 351 Inga Römer Gibt es einen kantianischen Intuitionismus in der Ethik? 369 Roberta De Monticelli Sensibility and Values Toward a Phenomenological Theory of the Emotional Life 381 Kathi Beier Stolz und Vorurteil. Über einige Schwierigkeiten der ethischen Selbstbewertung 401 Index of Names 413 Index of Subjects 419 One important strand in the contemporary debate over epistemological relativism focuses on the question whether, and to what extent, Wittgenstein in “On Certainty” (1969) leaned towards this position. This paper is a contribution to this strand. My discussion has four parts. I shall begin by out lining my interpretation of Wittgensteinian certainties. Subsequently I shall briefly introduce some central arguments for and against attributing epistemic relativism to “On Certainty”. This will be followed by a sketch of the cluster of ideas that–on my analysis–define important versions of the doctrine in question. And finally I shall give my own interpretation of “On Certainty” in relation to epistemic relativism. Publications of the series include the official proceedings of the ALWS-conferences and of their special workshops. The series is open also for other high-quality publications, especially on the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and its influence on contemporary analytic philosophy.