Amiens 1918: The Black Day of the German Army (Campaign)

Through the spring of 1918 of World War I (1914-1918), Germany had been on the offensive on the Western Front but had failed to break the Allies at any point. In July they had been forced back from the river Marne and were once again on the defensive. The Allies were now ready to increase the pressure. The Amiens area was selected and preparations were made in great secrecy with diversionary activity at other points on the line. 32 divisions were involved (twelve French, eight British, five Australian, four Canadian and one American) supported by over 500 tanks and overwhelming airpower. The first day saw an Allied advance of 5 miles across a 12-mile front, with over 27,000 German casualties. Progress was then less spectacular but by the time the battle ended on August 11 Germany had lost 75,000 men, and suffered a severe blow to morale. Amiens was notable for its successful application of the new combined-arms tactics, fully integrating infantry, artillery, armor and airpower at the commencement of the Allies' final, war-winning offensive. Published on the 90th anniversary of the battle, this book sets the strategic scene and clearly describes the fighting, highlighting the significance of the newly developed methods of war and detailing the troop movements that brought about the breakthrough and rapid advance that was achieved. The battle of Amiens was the turning point of World War I, confirming to all that the strategic initiative had decisively returned to the Allies. The battle heralded the arrival of new strategic, tactical and operational methods of attack for the Allies. Most importantly, by the time the battle ended on 11 August the desire of the German leadership to continue the war had been shattered. In this book Alistair McCluskey describes the course of the battle and the commanders involved. He details troop movements that illustrate the rapid advance of Allied forces, all of which are analysed using bo 1. Verdenskrig. I slaget ved Amiens 1918 mistede den tyske hær initiativet fordi den britiske og franske hær var klart overlegne både på det operative og taktiske niveau. Udfaldet af slaget var medvirkende til at den tyske kejser indså, at krigen ikke kunne fortsættes