Alexius Meinong, The Shepherd of Non-Being (Synthese Library Book 360)

This book explores the thought of Alexius Meinong, a philosopher known for his unconventional theory of reference and predication. The chapters cover a natural progression of topics, beginning with the origins of __Gegenstandstheorie__, Meinong’s theory of objects, and his discovery of assumptions as a fourth category of mental states to supplement his teacher Franz Brentano’s references to presentations, feelings, and judgments. The chapters explore further the meaning and metaphysics of fictional and other nonexistent intended objects, fine points in Meinongian object theory are considered and new and previously unanticipated problems are addressed. The author traces being and non-being and aspects of beingless objects including objects in fiction, ideal objects in scientific theory, objects ostensibly referred to in false science and false history and intentional imaginative projection of future states of affairs. The chapters focus on an essential choice of conceptual, logical, semantic, ontic and more generally metaphysical problems and an argument is progressively developed from the first to the final chapter, as key ideas are introduced and refined. Meinong studies have come a long way from Bertrand Russell’s off-target criticisms and recent times have seen a rise of interest in a Meinongian approach to logic and the theory of meaning. New thinkers see Meinong as a bridge figure between analytic and continental thought, thanks to the need for an adequate semantics of meaning in philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, making this book a particularly timely publication.​ Preface 10 Acknowledgments 14 Contents 16 Introduction: Meinong and Philosophical Analysis 22 Chapter 1: Meinong ́s Life and Philosophy 34 1.1 The Brentano School 34 1.2 Biographical Sketch 34 1.3 Meinong ́s Apprenticeship to Brentano 36 1.4 Intentionality Thesis in Descriptive Philosophical Psychology 40 1.5 Logic and Phenomenology: Höfler, Meinong, and Twardowski on the Act-Content-Object Structure of Thought 42 1.6 Gegenstandstheorie: Existent and Nonexistent Objects 45 1.7 Ontic Neutrality in Logic and Semantics: Problems for Meinong ́s Object Theory 50 1.8 Werttheorie: Values in Emotional Presentation 53 1.9 Meinong ́s Philosophy in the Brentanian Legacy 55 Chapter 2: Origins of Gegenstandstheorie: Immanent and Transcendent Intended Objects in Brentano, Twardowski, and Meinong 57 2.1 Immanent Objectivity 57 2.2 Immanence in a Closed Circle of Ideas 58 2.3 Twardowski ́s Content-Object Distinction 61 2.4 Mind-Independence Beyond Being and Non-Being 64 2.5 Brentano ́s Later Reism 66 Chapter 3: Meinong on the Phenomenology of Assumption 73 3.1 On Intentionality 73 3.2 Meinong ́s Intentionalist Object Theory 76 3.3 Phenomenology and the Meinongian Domain 78 3.4 Inner Perception and Unrestricted Freedom of Assumption 80 3.5 From Intentionality to Intensionality, Phenomenology to Object Theory 85 Chapter 4: Außersein of the Pure Object 90 4.1 Beyond Being and Non-Being 90 4.2 Ontology of Reference and Predication 93 4.3 From Quasisein to Außersein 95 4.4 Russell ́s Being-Predication Thesis 99 4.5 Toward an Analysis of Außersein 101 4.6 Husserl ́s Epoché and Meinong ́s Außersein 105 4.7 Meinong ́s Außersein and Quine ́s Critique of Beingless Objects 106 Chapter 5: Constitutive (Nuclear) and Extraconstitutive (Extranuclear) Properties 113 5.1 Fundamental Division 113 5.2 Sources and Background of Meinong ́s Distinction 115 5.3 Definitions 118 5.4 Findlay 120 5.5 Parsons 122 5.6 Routley 123 5.7 Logical Criteria for Nuclear and Extranuclear Properties 125 5.8 Existent Round Square, Watering-Down, and the Modal Moment 128 5.9 Converse Intentional Properties 132 5.10 Nuclear and Extranuclear Predications in the Logic of Fiction 135 5.11 Nuclear-Extranuclear Properties and Dual Modes of Predication 137 Chapter 6: Meditations on Meinong ́s Golden Mountain 140 6.1 Reference, Predication and Existence 140 6.2 On the Lowland Geography of Denotation 144 6.3 Russell ́s (Mis-) Interpretation of Meinong 148 6.4 Russell ́s Concept of Being 156 6.5 Base Camp on the Slopes of Meinong ́s Golden Mountain 161 6.6 Meinongian Intensionalist Logic of Definite Descriptions 166 6.7 At the Summit: Meinongian Critique of Russellian Definite Description 170 Chapter 7: Domain Comprehension in Meinongian Object Theory 173 7.1 Intended Objects in a Referential Domain 173 7.2 Grundideen of Meinongian Object Theory 174 7.3 Meinongian Intensional versus Fregean Extensional Reference Domains 175 7.4 Comprehension Principle for Meinongian Object Theory 179 7.5 Russell ́s Problem of the Existent Golden Mountain 180 7.6 Converse Intentional Properties as Intensional Identity Conditions 181 7.7 Synthesis of Alternative Complementary Solutions to Russell ́s Problem 183 7.8 Mind-Independent Objectivity of the Meinongian Domain 187 Chapter 8: Meinong ́s Concept of Implexive Being and Non-Being 190 8.1 Intertwining of Objects 190 8.2 Implexive Being, Non-Being, and So-Being 192 8.3 Formal Neo-Meinongian Theory of Implection 196 8.4 Meinongian Implection and Aristotelian Inherence 198 8.5 Objections to Meinong ́s Jungle 204 8.6 On Defoliating Meinong ́s Jungle 208 8.7 Aristotelian Realism and the Parmenidean One in Meinong ́s Object Theory Logic and Semantics 215 Chapter 9: About Nothing 219 9.1 Intentionality 219 9.2 Thinking About Nothing(ness) 220 9.3 Intentionality and a Strong Intentionality Thesis 222 9.4 Advantageous Semantic Resources of Intensional Logic 224 9.5 Intentionality and Intensional Logic 226 9.6 Intendability as a Constitutive Property of Intended Objects 228 9.7 Analysis of Intendable N-Nothing(ness) 237 9.8 N-Nothing(ness) Constitutive Only of N-Nothing(ness) 245 9.9 Can We Think About or Otherwise Intend N-Nothing(ness)? 248 9.10 Philosophical Applications of Intendable N-Nothing(ness) 249 9.11 Nothing Never Nothings. It Does Nothing of the Sort. 252 Chapter 10: Tarski ́s Quantificational Semantics and Meinongian Object Theory Domains 255 10.1 Model Sets and Intended Objects 255 10.2 Tarski ́s Analysis of Logical Truth 255 10.3 Counterexamples in Etchemendy ́s Critique 256 10.4 Reduction Principle for Tarski ́s Quantificational Criterion 259 10.5 Logical and Extralogical Terms, Vacuous and Nonvacuous Closure 261 10.6 Etchemendy ́s Philosophical Objections to the Reduction Principle 263 10.7 Contingency and Variation in Meinongian and Extensional Semantic Domains 266 10.8 Meinongian Object Theory as the Proper Application of Tarskian Quantificational Semantics 270 10.9 Non-Meinongian Revision of Tarki ́s Reduction Principle 271 Chapter 11: Reflections on Mally ́s Heresy 272 11.1 Mally ́s Heresy 272 11.2 Overview of Zalta ́s Distinction 273 11.3 Historical Roots of Meinongian Logic 274 11.4 Dual Modes of Predication and Constitutive-Extraconstitutive Properties 276 11.5 Encoding-Exemplification Ambiguities 276 11.6 Identity Problems for Zalta Objects 279 11.7 Amended Reduction of Zalta ́s Distinction 280 11.8 Fine ́s Correspondence Argument and Zalta ́s General Countercriticism of Reduction Strategies 282 Chapter 12: Virtual Relations and Meinongian Abstractions 287 12.1 Ontology Game 287 12.2 Russell ́s Argument for Relations as Universals 288 12.3 Relations and Relational Properties 290 12.4 Reference to and Existence of Relations 293 12.5 Ontic Neutrality and Epistemic Limitations 295 12.6 Virtual Relations as Ontically Neutral Intended Objects 297 Chapter 13: Truth and Fiction in Lewis ́s Critique of Meinongian Semantics 300 13.1 Semantics of Fiction 300 13.2 Lewis ́s Challenge to Meinong 301 13.3 Real and Fictional Objects and Properties 303 13.4 Indefinitely Numbered Fictional Objects 305 13.5 Definitely Numbered Indistinguishable Fictional Objects 306 13.6 Quantifier Restrictions in Meinongian Semantics 309 13.7 Inferences for Meinongian and Existent Objects 311 13.8 Limitations of Lewis-Style Story Contexting 315 13.9 Lewis ́s Modal Analysis of Fictional Worlds 317 13.10 Toward a Universal Semantics of Fiction and Nonfiction 322 Chapter 14: Anti-Meinongian Actualist Meaning of Fiction in Kripke ́s 1973 John Locke Lectures 324 14.1 Kripke ́s Locke Lectures 324 14.2 Meaning of Fiction and Realm of Modality 325 14.3 Kripke ́s Actualist Semantic Analysis of Fiction 329 14.4 Actualism Versus Meinongianism in Semantics of Fiction 330 14.5 Kripkean Actualism in the Semantics of Modal Logic and Fictional Discourse 332 14.6 Intentionality of Pretending in the Meaning of Fiction 334 14.7 Leibnizian Identity Conditions for Fictional Objects 337 14.8 Intentionality and Intending Fictional Objects 339 14.9 Ontic Neutrality of Identity Conditions for Fictional Intended Objects 343 14.10 Equivocal Ontic Status of Kripkean Fictional Characters 347 Chapter 15: Metaphysics of Meinongian Aesthetic Value 352 15.1 Aesthetic Value 352 15.2 Witasek ́s Aesthetics in Meinong ́s Graz School 353 15.3 Aesthetic Values as Meinongian Objects 354 15.4 Essentials of Meinongian Object Theory for Aesthetics 356 15.5 Meinongian Metaphysics of Aesthetic Objects and Values 359 15.6 Danto Aesthetic Value Puzzle 363 15.7 Objective Aesthetic Value Attributions 367 15.8 Vindicating Meinong ́s Subjectivity of Aesthetic Value 369 15.9 Aesthetic Value and the Indisputability of Taste 371 Chapter 16: Quantum Indeterminacy and Physical Reality as a Relevantly Predicationally Incomplete Existent Entity 375 16.1 Quantum Indeterminacy 375 16.2 Realist and Idealist Interpretations of Quantum Phenomena 377 16.3 Quantum Indeterminacy, Relevant and Irrelevant Predicational Completeness and Incompleteness 379 16.4 Predicational Incompleteness in a Meinongian Semantic Framework 382 Chapter 17: Confessions of a Meinongian Logician 384 17.1 Mea Culpa 384 17.2 Up from Extensionalism 386 17.3 My Life as a Meinongian 390 17.4 Laboring in the Meinongian Vineyard 392 17.5 Road Less Traveled 397 17.6 Epilogue 401 Chapter 18: Meinongian Dark Ages and Renaissance 402 18.1 Meinongian Anathema 402 18.2 Theft Over Honest Labor? 403 18.3 Meinongian Logic and the Extensionalist Alternative 405 18.4 Nonexistent Intended Objects in the Teleology of Action 405 18.5 Ontic Neutrality in the Semantics of Pure Logic 407 Appendix: Object Theory Logic and Mathematics: Two Essays by Ernst Mally (Translation and Critical Commentary) 409 Introduction 409 Mally ́s Logical Contributions 410 1908 Heidelberg Congress 411 Mally ́s First Paper 412 Logic of Determinations in Mally ́s Second Essay 414 Conclusion 415 Mally, Object Theory and Mathematics 416 Discussion 419 Mally, Basic Laws of Determination 419 Discussion 424 References 425 Index 441 Front Matter....Pages i-xxxii Meinong’s Life and Philosophy....Pages 1-23 Origins of Gegenstandstheorie: Immanent and Transcendent Intended Objects in Brentano, Twardowski, and Meinong....Pages 25-40 Meinong on the Phenomenology of Assumption....Pages 41-57 Außersein of the Pure Object....Pages 59-81 Constitutive (Nuclear) and Extraconstitutive (Extranuclear) Properties....Pages 83-109 Meditations on Meinong’s Golden Mountain....Pages 111-143 Domain Comprehension in Meinongian Object Theory....Pages 145-161 Meinong’s Concept of Implexive Being and Non-Being....Pages 163-191 About Nothing....Pages 193-228 Tarski’s Quantificational Semantics and Meinongian Object Theory Domains....Pages 229-245 Reflections on Mally’s Heresy....Pages 247-261 Virtual Relations and Meinongian Abstractions....Pages 263-275 Truth and Fiction in Lewis’s Critique of Meinongian Semantics....Pages 277-300 Anti-Meinongian Actualist Meaning of Fiction in Kripke’s 1973 John Locke Lectures....Pages 301-328 Metaphysics of Meinongian Aesthetic Value....Pages 329-351 Quantum Indeterminacy and Physical Reality as a Relevantly Predicationally Incomplete Existent Entity....Pages 353-361 Confessions of a Meinongian Logician....Pages 363-380 Meinongian Dark Ages and Renaissance....Pages 381-387 Back Matter....Pages 389-434