Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology (Consciousness and Self-Consciousness Series)

In recent years there has been much psychological and neurological work purporting to show that consciousness and self-awareness play no role in causing actions, and indeed to demonstrate that free will is an illusion. The essays in this volume subject the assumptions that motivate such claims to sustained interdisciplinary scrutiny. The book will be compulsory reading for psychologists and philosophers working on action explanation, and for anyone interested in the relation between the brain sciences and consciousness. 1. Agency and Self-Awareness: Mechanisms and Epistemology (Naomi Eilan and Johannes Roessler)......Page 2 2. The Sense of Agency: Awareness and Ownership of Action (Anthony Marcel)......Page 49 3. Action: Awareness, Ownership, and Knowledge (Christopher Peacocke)......Page 95 4. Conscious Awareness of Intention and of Action (Patrick Haggard)......Page 112 5. Consciousness of Action and Self-Consciousness: A Cognitive Neuroscience Approach (Marc Jeannerod)......Page 129 6. The Role of Demonstratives in Action-Explanation (John Campbell)......Page 151 7. Experimental Approaches to Action (Wolfgang Prinz)......Page 166 8. Perception and Agency (Thomas Baldwin)......Page 189 9. Fractionating the Intentional Control of Behaviour: A Neurophysiological Analysis (Glyn W. Humphreys and M. Jane Riddoch)......Page 202 10. Dual Control and the Causal Theory of Action: The Case of Non-Intentional Action (Josef Perner)......Page 219 11. The Development of Young Children's Action Control and Awareness (Douglas Frye and Philip David Zelazo)......Page 245 12. Children's Action Control and Awareness: Comment on Frye and Zelazo (Jennifer Hornsby)......Page 264 13. The Development of Self-Consciousness (Michael Lewis)......Page 276 14. Perceiving Intentions (Joelle Proust)......Page 297 15. The Sense of Ownership: An Analogy between Sensation and Action (Jerome Dokic)......Page 322 16. The Epistemology of Physical Action (Brian O'Shaughnessy)......Page 346 17. On Knowing One's Own Actions (Lucy O'Brien)......Page 359 18. Intentional Action and Self-Awareness (Johannes Roessler)......Page 384 Author Index......Page 407 Subject Index......Page 413 There Has Been Much Psychological And Neurological Work Purporting To Show That Consciousness And Self-awareness Play No Role In Causing Actions. The Essays In This Volume Subject The Assumptions That Motivate Such Claims To Sustained Interdisciplinary Scrutiny. Agency And Self-awareness: Mechanisms And Epistemology Naomi Eilan And Johannes Roessler -- Sense Of Agency: Awareness And Ownership Of Action Anthony Marcel -- Action: Awareness, Ownership, And Knowledge Christopher Peacocke -- Conscious Awareness Of Intention And Of Action Patrick Haggard -- Consciousness Of Action And Self-consciousness: A Cognitive Neuroscience Approach Marc Jeannerod -- Role Of Demonstratives In Action-explanation John Campbell -- Experimental Approaches To Action Wolfgang Prinz -- Perception And Agency Thomas Baldwin -- Fractionating The Intentional Control Of Behaviour: A Neuropsychological Analysis Glyn W. Humphreys And M. Jane Riddoch -- Dual Control And The Causal Theory Of Action: The Case Of Non-intentional Action Josef Perner -- Development Of Young Children's Action Control And Awareness Douglas Frye And Philip David Zelazo -- Children's Action Control And Awareness: Comment On Frye And Zelazo Jennifer Hornsby -- Development Of Self-consciousness Michael Lewis -- Perceiving Intentions Joelle Proust -- Sense Of Ownership: An Alalogy Between Sensation And Action Jerome Dokic -- Epistemologyof Physical Action Brian O'shaughnessy -- On Knowing One's Own Actions Lucy O'brien -- Intentional Action And Self-awareness Johannes Roessler. Edited By Johannes Roessler And Naomi Eilan. Includes Bibliographical References And Indexes.