Against Knowledge Closure

"Knowledge closure is the claim that, if an agent S knows P, recognizes that P implies Q, and believes Q because it is implied by P, then S knows Q. Closure is a pivotal epistemological principle that is widely endorsed by contemporary epistemologists. Against Knowledge Closure is the first book-length treatment of the issue and the most sustained argument for closure failure to date. Unlike most prior arguments for closure failure, Marc Alspector-Kelly's critique of closure does not presuppose any particular epistemological theory; his argument is, instead, intuitively compelling and applicable to a wide variety of epistemological views. His discussion ranges over much of the epistemological landscape, including skepticism, warrant, transmission and transmission failure, fallibilism, sensitivity, safety, evidentialism, reliabilism, contextualism, entitlement, circularity and bootstrapping, justification, and justification closure. As a result, the volume will be of interest to any epistemologist or student of epistemology and related subjects."--Back cover Chapter 10 Abominable Conjunctions, Contextualism, and the Spreading Problem 10.1 Arguing against Closure Denial 10.2 Abominable Conjunctions 10.3 Abominable Conjunctions and Contextualism 10.3.1 DeRose versus Heller 10.3.2 Extrapolating from High- to Low-Standards Contexts 10.3.3 The Felicity of the Denials of Skeptical Hypotheses in Ordinary Contexts 10.3.4 Comparative Judgments 10.3.5 Generalizing 10.4 Contextualism and Anti-Skeptical Sources of Warrant 10.4.1 Contextualism and Transmission 10.4.2 Contextualism and Front-Loading 10.4.3 Contextualism and Safety 10.4.4 Contextualism and Direct Warrant 10.4.5 Contextualism and Warrant Infallibilism 10.4.6 Contextualism and Warrant by Entitlement 10.5 Abominable Conjunctions and Interest-Relative Invariantism 10.6 Abominable Conjunctions and Classical Moderate Invariantism 10.7 Abominable Conjunctions and the Knowledge Rule 10.7.1 The Knowledge-Rule Explanation 10.7.2 Gettier Versions of Abominable Conjunctions 10.7.3 Transmission and Retraction 10.7.4 Third-Person Abominable Conjunctions 10.7.5 Asserting ‘‘I Don’t Know’’ 10.8 Assumptions and Skepticism 10.8.1 Second-Order Skepticism 10.8.2 What Are Assumptions? 10.8.3 Dismissing versus Answering the Skeptic 10.8.4 Reasonable Assumptions 10.8.5 Summary 10.9 The Spreading Problem This is the first book-length treatment of knowledge closure, a central and widely endorsed principle in epistemology. The volume provides a new and sustained defense of 'closure failure' and will be relevant to anyone studying or working in epistemology and related philosophical disciplines. Presents A New And Comprehensive Defense Of Closure Failure That Is Relevant To A Wide Variety Of Epistemic Issues.