Against a Hindu God : Buddhist Philosophy of Religion in India

Philosophical arguments for and against the existence of God have been crucial to Euro-American and South Asian philosophers for over a millennium. Critical to the history of philosophy in India, were the centuries-long arguments between Buddhist and Hindu philosophers about the existence of a God-like being called Isvara and the religious epistemology used to support them. By focusing on the work of Ratnakirti, one of the last great Buddhist philosophers of India, and his arguments against his Hindu opponents, Parimal G. Patil illuminates South Asian intellectual practices and the nature of philosophy during the final phase of Buddhism in India. Based at the famous university of Vikramasila, Ratnakirti brought the full range of Buddhist philosophical resources to bear on his critique of his Hindu opponents' cosmological/design argument. At stake in his critique was nothing less than the nature of inferential reasoning, the metaphysics of epistemology, and the relevance of philosophy to the practice of religion. In developing a proper comparative approach to the philosophy of religion, Patil transcends the disciplinary boundaries of religious studies, philosophy, and South Asian studies and applies the remarkable work of philosophers like Ratnakirti to contemporary issues in philosophy and religion. Why is money more valuable than the paper on which it is printed? Monetarists link the value of money to its supply and demand, believing the latter depends on the total value of the commodities it circulates. According to Prabhat Patnaik, this logic is flawed. In his view, in any nonbarter economy, the value we assign to money is determined independently of its supply and demand. Through an original and provocative critique of monetarism, Patnaik advances a revolutionary understanding of macroeconomics that highlights the "propertyist" position of Karl Marx and John Maynard Keynes. Unlike the usual division between "classical" economists (e.g., David Ricardo and Marx) and the "marginalists" (e.g., Carl Menger, William Stanley Jevons, and Lon Walras), Patnaik places "monetarists," including Ricardo, on one side, while grouping propertyist writers like Marx, Keynes, and Rosa Luxemburg on the other. This second group subscribes to the idea that the value of money is given from outside the realm of supply and demand, therefore making money a form in which wealth is held. The fact that money is held as wealth in turn gives rise to the possibility of deficiency of aggregate demand under capitalism. It is no accident that this possibility was highlighted by Marx and Keynes while going largely unrecognized by Ricardo and contemporary monetarists. At the same time, Patnaik points to a weakness in the Marx-Keynes traditionnamely, its lack of any satisfactory explanation of why the value of money, determined from outside the realm of supply and demand, remains relatively stable over long stretches of time. The answer to this question lies in the fact that capitalism is not a self-contained system but is born from a precapitalist setting with which it interacts and where it creates massive labor reserves that, in turn, impart stability to the value of money. Patnaik's theory of money, then, is also a theory of imperialism, and he concludes with a discussion of the contemporary international monetary system, which he terms the "oil-dollar" standard. Why is money more valuable than the paper on which it is printed? Monetarists link the value of money to its supply and demand, believing the latter depends on the total value of the commodities it circulates. According to Prabhat Patnaik, this logic is flawed. In his view, in any nonbarter economy, the value we assign to money is determined independently of its supply and demand.Through an original and provocative critique of monetarism, Patnaik advances a revolutionary understanding of macroeconomics that highlights the'propertyist'position of Karl Marx and John Maynard Keynes. Unlike the usual division between'classical'economists (e.g., David Ricardo and Marx) and the'marginalists'(e.g., Carl Menger, William Stanley Jevons, and Léon Walras), Patnaik places'monetarists,'including Ricardo, on one side, while grouping propertyist writers like Marx, Keynes, and Rosa Luxemburg on the other. This second group subscribes to the idea that the value of money is given from outside the realm of supply and demand, therefore making money a form in which wealth is held. The fact that money is held as wealth in turn gives rise to the possibility of deficiency of aggregate demand under capitalism. It is no accident that this possibility was highlighted by Marx and Keynes while going largely unrecognized by Ricardo and contemporary monetarists. At the same time, Patnaik points to a weakness in the Marx-Keynes tradition—namely, its lack of any satisfactory explanation of why the value of money, determined from outside the realm of supply and demand, remains relatively stable over long stretches of time. The answer to this question lies in the fact that capitalism is not a self-contained system but is born from a precapitalist setting with which it interacts and where it creates massive labor reserves that, in turn, impart stability to the value of money. Patnaik's theory of money, then, is also a theory of imperialism, and he concludes with a discussion of the contemporary international monetary system, which he terms the'oil-dollar'standard. Contents Abbreviations Introduction 1. Comparative Philosophy of Religions 1. Disciplinary Challenges 2. A Grammar for Comparison 3. Comparative Philosophy of Religions 4. Content, Structure, and Arguments Part 1. Epistemology 2. Religious Epistemology in Classical India: In Defense of a Hindu God 1. Interpreting Nyaya Epistemology 2. The Nyaya Argument for the Existence of Irvara 3. Defending the Nyaya Argument 4. Conclusion: Shifting the Burden of Proof 3. Against Irvara: Ratnakirti’s Buddhist Critique 1. The Section on Pervasion: The Trouble with Natural Relations 2. Two Arguments 3. The Section on the Reason Property 4. The Section on the Target Property 5. Conclusion: Is Irvara the Maker of the World? Part 2. Language, Mind, and Ontology 4. The Theory of Exclusion, Conceptual Content, and Buddhist Epistemology 1. The Theory of Exclusion 2. What Exclusion Is Not 3. Semantic Value 4. Ratnakirti’s Inferential Argument 5. Conclusion: Jñanarrimitra’s Three Questions 5. Ratnakirti’s World: Toward a Buddhist Philosophy of Everything 1. An Inventory of Mental Objects/Images 2. The Contents of Perception 3. The Contents of Inferential/Verbal Awareness 4. Nonexistence, Existence, and Ultimate Existence 5. The Irvara- Inference, Revisited 6. Conclusion: Who Created the World? Conclusion 6. The Values of Buddhist Epistemology 1. Foundational Figures and Foundational Texts 2. The Soteriological Signifi cance of Epistemology 3. Jñanarrimitra on Epistemology as Pedagogy 4. Ratnakirti’s Framework of Value 5. Conclusion: Religious Reasoning as Religious Practice References Index Comparative philosophy of religions Disciplinary challenges A grammar for comparison Comparative philosophy of religions Content, structure, and arguments Epistemology Religious epistemology in classical India: in defense of a Hindu god Interpreting Nyāya epistemology The Nyāya argument for the existence of Īśvara Defending the Nyāya argument Shifting the burden of proof Against Īśvara: Ratnakīrti's Buddhist critique The section on pervasion: the trouble with natural relations Two arguments The section on the reason property The section on the target property Is Īśvara the maker of the world? Language, mind, and ontology The theory of exclusion, conceptual content, and Buddhist Epistemology The theory of exclusion What exclusion is not Semantic value Ratnakīrti's inferential argument Jñānaśrīmitra's three questions Ratnakīrti's world: toward a Buddhist philosophy of everything An inventory of mental objects/images The contents of perception The contents of inferential/verbal awareness Nonexistence, existence, and ultimate existence The Īśvara-inference, revisited Who created the world? The values of Buddhist epistemology Foundational figures and foundational texts The soteriological significance of epistemology Jñānaśrīmitra on epistemology as pedagogy Ratnakīrti's framework of value Religious reasoning as religious practice. According to Prabhat Patnaik, even in a nonbarter economy, the value we assign to money is determined independently of its supply and demand, thus making money a form in which wealth is held