After the war : nation-building from FDR to George W. Bush

This book examines how the United States has gained considerable experience in nation-building operations through its participation in at least eight significant operations since World War II-in Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In recent decades, the United States' overwhelming military superiority has allowed it to 'overawe' or overrun adversaries with comparative ease. However, consolidating victory and preventing a renewal of conflict has usually taken more time, energy, and resources than originally foreseen. Few recent efforts of this sort can be regarded as unqualified successes, and one or two must be accounted as clear failures. Prior RAND research examined the factors that contribute to this success or failure, including the natures of the society being reformed and of the conflict being terminated, as well as the quality and quantity of the military and civil assets of external actors. This volume addresses the manner in which U.S. policy toward postconflict reconstruction has been created and implemented and the effect that these processes have had on mission outcomes. Through the lens of presidential decisionmaking style and administrative structure, from the post-World War II era through the Cold War, post-Cold War era, and current war on terrorism, it is both possible and necessary to reassess how these elements can work in favor of, as well as against, the nation-building goals of the U.S. government and military and those of its coalition partners and allies In recent decades, the United States' overwhelming military superiority has allowed it to "overawe" or overrun adversaries with comparative ease. However, consolidating victory and preventing a renewal of conflict has usually taken more time, energy, and resources than originally foreseen. Few recent efforts of this sort can be regarded as unqualified successes, and one or two must be accounted as clear failures. Prior RAND research examined the factors that contribute to this success or failure, including the natures of the society being reformed and of the conflict being terminated, as well as the quality and quantity of the military and civil assets of external actors. This volume addresses the manner in which presidential style, interagency structures, and decisionmaking processes have affected the eventual outcomes. The study found that some administrations have proved better at this than others, that all improved over time, and that this enhanced capability often failed to carry over to their successors. From the post–World War II era through the Cold War, post–Cold War era, and current war on terrorism, this volume assesses how U.S. presidential decisionmaking style and administrative structure can work in favor of, as well as against, the nation-building goals of the U.S. government and military and those of its coalition partners and allies. This volume assesses the impact of U.S. presidential decisionmaking style and administrative structure on nation-building, from the post-World War II era through the Cold War, post-Cold War era, and current war on terrorism