Afghanistan: Aid, Armies and Empires (Library of Modern Middle East Studies)

"As the battle for Afghanistan intensifies, with humanitarian workers increasingly finding themselves on the frontline, aid expert Peter Marsden draws on decades of personal experience in the country to unravel the relationship between great power politics and development, from the Great Game era to the present day. Whilst the US has recently been criticised for blurring the distinctions between military and humanitarian operations, the use of aid to further great power strategic objectives is, Marsden finds, nothing new. Examining the interventions of the British in the 19th Century, the Soviets in 1979, and the US in 2001, he brings to light significant new information on the use of aid in pursuit of strategic objectives. Drawing on his own experience, he explains the changing relationship between the aid community and different Afghan governments, including the Taliban. His rigorously argued conclusions are surprising and make compelling reading matter for military and humanitarian policymakers alike. "Afghanistan: Aid, Armies and Empires" offers both a coruscating exploration of the relationship between aid and power, and a fresh and original history of Afghanistan through the prism of great power politics--Bloomsbury Publishing." As the battle for Afghanistan intensifies, with the NATO-led coalition seemingly unable to defeat the Taliban, and struggling in its nation building efforts, Afghanistan expert Peter Marsden looks at why it is that the Great Powers, from 19th-century Britain to the 20th-century Soviet Union to 21st-century America, have so often been frustrated in attempting to impose their will on this strategically vital country. In comparing the three interventions, Marsden uncovers a number of similarities. The rhetoric of'development'coming from the capitals of the West has, he finds, a well-established heritage. Every would-be occupier has used some form of aid to try and turn Afghanistan into the kind of country that would suit their geopolitical objectives. Marsden, who has worked with British NGOs in Afghanistan for 20 years, draws on his own experience as well as extensive archive research to establish how these grand interventions appear from the Afghan perspective, and why it is that ordinary Afghans seem to be better off when they are attracting less, not more, attention from the world powers. He argues that the Americans have yet to learn the lessons that the Soviets and the British before them learned: that no amount of financial, military or humanitarian aid will'stabilise'the country if it comes with violence and foreign occupation. Afghanistan - Aid, Armies and Empires offers both an exploration of the relationship between aid and power, and a fresh and original history of Afghanistan through the prism of great power politics. As the battle for Afghanistan intensifies, with humanitarian workers increasingly finding themselves on the frontline, aid expert Peter Marsden draws on decades of personal experience in the country to unravel the relationship between great power politics and development, from the Great Game era to the present day. While the US has recently been criticized for blurring the distinctions between military and humanitarian operations, the use of aid to further great power strategic objectives is, Marsden finds, nothing new. Examining the interventions of the British in the 19th Century, the Soviets in 1979, and the US in 2001, he brings to light significant new information on the use of aid in pursuit of strategic objectives. Drawing on his own experience, he explains the changing relationship between the aid community and different Afghan governments, including the Taliban. His rigorously argued conclusions are surprising; and make compelling reading matter for military and humanitarian policymakers alike. Afghanistan: Aid, Armies and Empires offers both a coruscating exploration of the relationship between aid and power, and a fresh and original history of Afghanistan through the prism of great power politics As the battle for Afghanistan intensifies and the NATO-led coalition seemingly unable to defeat the Taliban and struggling in its nation-building efforts, the author looks at why it is that the great powers, from 19th century Britain to the 20th-century Soviet Union to the 21st-century America, have so often been thwarted when attempting to impose their will on this strategically vital country. In comparing three interventions, the author uncovers some similarities. Every would-be occupier has used some form of aid to try to turn Afghanistan into the kind of country that would suit their geopolitical objectives. He looks at how these interventions appear from the Afghan perspective and why ordinary Afghans seem better off when they are attracting less, not more, attention from world powers. He says that no amount of financial, military or humanitarian aid will stabilize the country if it comes with violence and foreign occupation. 1. Introduction -- 2. Great Game -- 3. Build-up To The Soviet Intervention -- 4. Soviet Military Intervention -- 5. Build-up To The Us-led Intervention -- 6. Us-led Military Intervention -- 7. Relationship Between Us Strategy And The Aid Process -- 8. Specific Impact Of Development And Humanitarian Assistance -- 9. Interface Between Ngos And The International Military -- 10. Conclusions. Peter Marsden. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [229]-230) And Index.