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Action (1893) : Essay on a Critique of Life and a Science of Practice

معرفی کتاب «Action (1893) : Essay on a Critique of Life and a Science of Practice» نوشتهٔ Maurice Blondel; Oliva Blanchette، منتشرشده توسط نشر University of Notre Dame Press در سال 2004. این کتاب در فرمت pdf، زبان انگلیسی ارائه شده است.

Action was once a prominent theme in philosophical reflection. It figured prominently in Aristotelian philosophy, and the medieval Scholastics built some of their key adages around it. But by the time Maurice Blondel came to focus on it for his own philosophical reflection, it had all but disappeared from the philosophical vocabulary. It is no longer possible or legitimate to ignore action in philosophy as it was in France when Blondel appeared on the scene in 1882, when at the age of 21 he first began to focus on action as a dissertation subject, and in 1893, when he defended and published the dissertation now presented here for the English reader. In *L'Action*, Blondel developed a "philosophy of action" in which he applies the method of phenomenology. This leads him to the first order issue of "action", critiquing the Enlightenment enshrinement of thought, which he subsumes under the category of action. This leads him to discover the distinction between the willing will and the willed will. This distinction shows a real insufficiency between the two elements of the will. The problem of connaturility - that man cannot desire something which cannot be fulfilled - leads to investigating how the willing will can be fulfilled in the willed will. This insufficiency leads him to eventually hypothesize the supernatural as the only real possibility. He insists that this is as far as a philosopher can go, that the supernatural is the real end of man, and that the content of the supernatural is left to the realm of theology. (Source: [Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maurice_Blondel)) By Maurice Blondel ; Translated By Oliva Blanchette. Translated From: L'action.
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