Act and Crime: The Philosophy of Action and its Implications for Criminal Law (Clarendon Law Series)

## Abstract This book seeks illumination of three aspects of Anglo-American criminal law by the philosophy of action. These are, first, the general requirement that an accused perform some voluntary act before he can be convicted of crime; second, that that voluntary act have the properties marking it as one of the kinds of acts prohibited by statute, what lawyers call the ‘actus reus’ of crimes; and third, the double jeopardy requirement that no one should be prosecuted or punished more than once for doing but one act instantiating but one offence. These three requirements are seen as part of the ‘general part’ of the criminal law, the part that applies to all crimes and that gives the criminal law a unified structure. As such they aid both the efficient drafting of a criminal code by the legislature and the application/interpretation of criminal codes by courts. The theory of action defended in the book – and from which illumination of the criminal law is sought – in a version of the family of theories known as causal theories of action. The thesis is that actions are those bodily movements caused by volitions when those volitions have those movements as their object, and nothing else. The criminal law's voluntary act requirement is then seen as the requirement that there be such an act. Omissions, states a person is in, thoughts, and involuntary bodily movements such as reflex reactions, are not acts by such a causal theory. The criminal law's actus reus requirement is seen as the requirement that a voluntary act must possess those causal or other properties definitive of the types of action prohibited by a criminal code. And the criminal law's double jeopardy requirements is seen as a conjunctive requirement: first, that no one be punished for the same kind of action, where the identity of act-types is governed by the kinds of acts morality makes wrong; unless the actor did that act more than once, where the identity of act-tokens is governed by the theory of action defended throughout the book. The philosophy of action illuminates the criminal law in these three ways because of certain moral theses, which the book also defends; that criminal liability both does and should track moral responsibility; that moral responsibility exists principally for what we do rather than for who we are, what we think, or what we fail to prevent; that actions causing harms are more blameworthy than actions that only risk or attempt such harms; and that punishment should be in proposition to the number and degree of wrong(s) done. Act And Crime For The First Time Provides A Unified Account Of The Theory Of Action Presupposed By Both Anglo-american Criminal Law And The Morality That Underlies It. The Book Defends The View That Human Actions Are Always Volitionally Caused Bodily Movements And Nothing Else. The Theory Is Used To Illuminate Three Major Problems In The Drafting And The Interpretation Of Criminal Codes: (1) What The Voluntary Act Requirement Both Does And Should Require; (2) What Complex Descriptions Of Actions Prohibited By Criminal Codes Both Do And Should Require (in Addition To The Doing Of A Voluntary Act); And (3) When Two Actions Are 'the Same' For Purposes Of Assessing Whether Multiple Prosecutions And Multiple Punishments Are Warranted. The Book Both Contributes To The Development Of A Coherent Theory Of Action In Philosophy, And It Provides Both Legislators And Judges (and The Lawyers Who Argue To Both) A Grounding In Three Of The Most Basic Elements Of Criminal Liability.--jacket. Michael S. Moore. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [391]-403) And Index. Also Available Online. In print for the first time in over ten years, Act and Crime provides a unified account of the theory of action presupposed by both Anglo-American criminal law and the morality that underlies it. The book defends the view that human actions are always volitionally caused by bodily movements and nothing else. The theory is used to illuminate three major problems in drafting the interpretation of criminal 1) what the voluntary act requirement both does and should require; 2) what complex descriptions of actions prohitbited by criminal codes both do and should require (in addition to the doing of a voluntary act); and 3) when two actions are 'the same' for purposes of assessing whether multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments are warranted. The book both contributes to the development of a coherent theory of action in philosophy, and it provides both legislators and judges (and the lawyers who argue to both) a grounding in three of the most basic elelments of criminal liability. What implications are there for the criminal law from the philosophy of action? Providing a unified account of the theory of action presupposed by both Anglo-American criminal law and the morality that underlies it, Moore develops a coherent theory of action in philosophy and assesses its effects on criminal law. This study looks at three of the most basic elements of criminal liability: when does a person "act"? When do his acts fall within the prohibitions of criminal law? And when do his acts overlap sufficiently that he may be prosecuted or punished only once for them?