A Theory of the State: Economic Rights, Legal Rights, and the Scope of the State (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics breaks apart the narrow disciplinary and subfield boundaries that have fragmented the study of both traditional social movements as well as their non-routine politics. By exploring non-institutionalized political actions, including revolutions, democratization, cycles of protest, and ethnic conflicts, the connections between a wide array of political and social phenomena are examined in national, comparative, and global perspectives.This book models the emergence and evolution of the rule-of-law state. The protector or a ruler is assumed to be self-seeking. Individuals will install a protector only after they create institutions to control him. Organized protection engenders legal institutions that enforce rights. A" state of nature" then gradually turns into a rule-of-law state. Individuals employ both the state and other third parties for enforcement. The fraction of agreements that the state enforces determines its scope. Rule-of-law states encourage market transactions and standards that facilitate trade. The larger the domain of the state's ultimate enforcer, the greater the advantage of scale economies to contracting. This force may explain the creation of rule-of-law empires. This Book Models The Emergence Of The State And The Forces That Shape It. State Creation Is Bound To Protection Needs. A Specialized Protector-ruler Is Efficient, But Is Also Self-seeking. Individuals Are Expected To Install Rulers Only After They Have Created Mechanisms To Control Them. Among The Offshoots Of The Organized Protection Are A Legal System And Decision-making Procedures That Include Voting. The Initial State Of Nature, Then, May Gradually Evolve Into A Rule-of-law State.--jacket. 1. Introduction -- 1. The Emergence Of Protection And Third-party Enforcement. 2. The State And The Enforcement Of Agreements. 3. Third-party Enforcement And The State. 4. The Choice Among Enforcement Forms. 5. Anonymous Exchange, Mixed Enforcement, And Vertical Integration. 6. Jurisdictional Issues. 7. Collective Action And Collective Decisions. 8. Tying The Protector's Hands: The Agreement Between Subjects And Protector -- 2. The Emergence Of Legal Institutions. 9. Legal Rights. 10. The State's Enhancement Of Market Trade. 11. The Size And Scope Of The State -- 3. The Character Of The State. 11. Merger And Local Autonomy. 13. The Distinction Between Legitimate And Criminal States. Yoram Barzel. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 277-281) And Index. "This book models the emergence of the state, and the forces that shape it. State creation is bound to protection needs. A specialized protector-ruler is efficient, but is also self-seeking. Individuals will install a ruler only after they create a mechanism to control him. Among the offshoots of the organized protection are legal system and decision-making procedures that include voting. The initial 'state of nature' may gradually evolve into a rule-of-law state. The state endows individuals with rights by delineating what it will protect. Enforcement, however, is never perfect. People use third parties such as firms to enforce agreements. As commodities become standardized, scale economies increase. In order to exploit the economies of within-state enforcement, the state will expand the contact enforcement territory by treaty or by conquest. The force may explain the creation of rule-of-law empires." Editor's description