A Theory of Political Obligation : Membership, Commitment, and the Bonds of Society

Margaret Gilbert offers an incisive new approach to a classic problem of political philosophy: when and why should I do what the law tells me to do? Do I have special obligations to conform to the laws of my own country and if so, why? In what sense, if any, must I fight in wars in which my country is engaged, if ordered to do so, or suffer the penalty for law breaking—including the death penalty? Gilbert's accessible book offers a provocative and compelling case in favor of citizens' obligations to the state, while examining how these can be squared with self-interest and other competing considerations. Contents......Page 10 Part I. A Central Problem of Political Obligation......Page 12 1.1. The problem......Page 14 1.2. Four distinct questions......Page 29 2.1. The variety of obligations......Page 37 2.2. Initial assumptions about obligation......Page 38 2.3. Directed obligations......Page 46 2.4. Imputed obligations......Page 52 3.1. Desiderata for a theory of political obligation......Page 54 3.2. Some less than promising notions of membership......Page 64 4.1. Actual contract theory......Page 66 4.2. Analytic attractions......Page 68 4.3. Moral attractions......Page 75 5.1. The no-agreement objection......Page 81 5.2. The no-obligation objection......Page 86 5.3. Other objections......Page 94 5.4. Actual contract theory assessed......Page 97 5.5. Some proposed alternatives to actual contract theory......Page 98 Part II. Societies, Membership, and Obligation......Page 102 6.1. Societies as social groups......Page 104 6.2. Acting together: observations......Page 112 6.3. How joint action comes about......Page 127 6.4. The need for a theory......Page 132 7.1. Commitment......Page 136 7.2. Joint commitment......Page 145 7.3. Acting together......Page 157 7.4. Joint commitment and obligation......Page 158 8.1. The range of plural subjects......Page 176 8.2. Plural subjects and common ideas about social groups......Page 178 8.3. Large populations as plural subjects......Page 184 Part III. A Solution to the Membership Problem......Page 194 9.1. Social rules: Hart's account......Page 196 9.2. Three issues for an account of social rules......Page 206 9.3. Social rules: a plural subject account......Page 208 9.4. Three forms of political institution......Page 215 10.1. What is an agreement? The joint decision proposal......Page 226 10.2. Agreements and promises as a source of obligation......Page 234 10.3. Moral argument around the promise......Page 238 10.4. Implications for actual contract theory......Page 245 11.1. The theory assessed......Page 249 11.2. Comparison with three related theories......Page 271 11.3. Response to objections......Page 277 11.4. The practical import of political obligations......Page 286 12.1. Summary......Page 298 12.2. Prospect......Page 304 Bibliography......Page 309 A......Page 318 C......Page 321 D......Page 323 E......Page 324 G......Page 325 H......Page 326 J......Page 327 M......Page 329 N......Page 331 O......Page 332 P......Page 334 R......Page 337 S......Page 339 U......Page 342 W......Page 343 Contents 10 Part I. A Central Problem of Political Obligation 12 1. The Membership Problem 14 1.1. The problem 14 1.2. Four distinct questions 29 2. Obligations: Preliminary Points 37 2.1. The variety of obligations 37 2.2. Initial assumptions about obligation 38 2.3. Directed obligations 46 2.4. Imputed obligations 52 3. In Pursuit of a Theory of Political Obligation 54 3.1. Desiderata for a theory of political obligation 54 3.2. Some less than promising notions of membership 64 4. Actual Contract Theory: Attractions 66 4.1. Actual contract theory 66 4.2. Analytic attractions 68 4.3. Moral attractions 75 5. Objections to Actual Contract Theory 81 5.1. The no-agreement objection 81 5.2. The no-obligation objection 86 5.3. Other objections 94 5.4. Actual contract theory assessed 97 5.5. Some proposed alternatives to actual contract theory 98 Part II. Societies, Membership, and Obligation 102 6. Social Groups: Starting Small 104 6.1. Societies as social groups 104 6.2. Acting together: observations 112 6.3. How joint action comes about 127 6.4. The need for a theory 132 7. Joint Commitment and Obligation 136 7.1. Commitment 136 7.2. Joint commitment 145 7.3. Acting together 157 7.4. Joint commitment and obligation 158 8. Societies as Plural Subjects 176 8.1. The range of plural subjects 176 8.2. Plural subjects and common ideas about social groups 178 8.3. Large populations as plural subjects 184 Part III. A Solution to the Membership Problem 194 9. Political Societies 196 9.1. Social rules: Hart's account 196 9.2. Three issues for an account of social rules 206 9.3. Social rules: a plural subject account 208 9.4. Three forms of political institution 215 10. Reconsidering Actual Contract Theory 226 10.1. What is an agreement? The joint decision proposal 226 10.2. Agreements and promises as a source of obligation 234 10.3. Moral argument around the promise 238 10.4. Implications for actual contract theory 245 11. The Plural Subject Theory of Political Obligation 249 11.1. The theory assessed 249 11.2. Comparison with three related theories 271 11.3. Response to objections 277 11.4. The practical import of political obligations 286 12. Summary and Prospect 298 12.1. Summary 298 12.2. Prospect 304 Bibliography 309 Index 318 A 318 B 321 C 321 D 323 E 324 F 325 G 325 H 326 I 327 J 327 K 329 L 329 M 329 N 331 O 332 P 334 R 337 S 339 T 342 U 342 V 343 W 343 Margaret Gilbert offers an incisive new approach to a classic problem of political philosophy: when and why should I do what the laws of my country tell me to do? Beginning with carefully argued accounts of social groups in general and political societies in particular, the author argues that in central, standard senses of the relevant terms membership in a political society in and of itself obligates one to support that society's political institutions. The obligations in question are not moral requirements derived from general moral principles, as is often supposed, but a matter of one's participation in a special kind of commitment: joint commitment. An agreement is sufficient but not necessary to generate such a commitment. Gilbert uses the phrase'plural subject'to refer to all of those who are jointly committed in some way. She therefore labels the theory offered in this book the plural subject theory of political obligation. The author concentrates on the exposition of this theory, carefully explaining how and in what sense joint commitments obligate. She also explores a classic theory of political obligation --- actual contract theory --- according to which one is obligated to conform to the laws of one's country because one agreed to do so. She offers a new interpretation of this theory in light of a theory of plural subject theory of agreements. She argues that actual contract theory has more merit than has been thought, though the more general plural subject theory is to be preferred. She compares and contrasts plural subject theory with identification theory, relationship theory, and the theory of fair play. She brings it to bear on some classic situations of crisis, and, in the concluding chapter, suggests a number of avenues for related empirical and moral inquiry. Clearly and compellingly written, A Theory of Political Obligation will be essential reading for political philosophers and theorists. Margaret Gilbert offers an incisive new approach to a classic problem of political philosophy: when and why should I do what the law tells me to do? She argues a provocative and compelling case in favour of citizens' obligations to the state, while examining how these can be squared with self-interest and other competing considerations Margaret Gilbert offers an incisive new approach to a classic problem of political philosophy: when and why should I do what the laws of my country tell me to do? She provides a compelling case in favour of the citizens' obligations to the state, while examining how it can be squared with self-interest "Margaret Gilbert offers an incisive new approach to a classic problem of political philosophy: when and why should I do what the laws of my country tell me to do? A Theory of Political Obligation will be essential reading for political philosophers and theorists."--Jacket