A Theory of Legal Punishment: Deterrence, Retribution, and the Aims of the State (Routledge Research in Legal Philosophy)

This book argues for a mixed theory of legal punishment that treats both crime reduction and retribution as important aims of the state. A central question in the philosophy of law is why the state’s punishment of its own citizens is justified. Traditionally, two theories of punishment have dominated the field: consequentialism and retributivism. According to consequentialism, punishment is justified when it maximizes positive outcomes. According to retributivism, criminals should be punished because they deserve it. This book recognizes the strength of both positions. According to the two-tiered model, the institution of punishment and statutory penalties, as set by the legislature, are justified based on their costs and benefits, in terms of deterrence and rehabilitation. The law exists to preserve the public order. Criminal courts, by contrast, determine who is punished and how much based on what offenders deserve. The courts express the community’s collective sense of resentment at being wronged. This book supports the two-tiered model by showing that it accords with our moral intuitions, commonly held (compatibilist) theories of freedom, and assumptions about how the extent of our knowledge affects our obligations. It engages classic and contemporary work in the philosophy of law and explains the theory’s advantages over competing approaches from retributivists and other mixed theorists. The book also defends consequentialism against a longstanding objection that the social sciences give us little guidance regarding which policies to adopt. Drawing on recent criminological research, the two-tiered model can help us to address some of our most pressing social issues, including the death penalty, drug policy, and mass incarceration. This book will be of interest to philosophers, legal scholars, policymakers, and social scientists, especially criminologists, economists, and political scientists. "This book argues for a mixed view of punishment that balances consequentialism and retributivism. He has published extensively on philosophy and applied ethics. A central question in the philosophy of law is why the state's punishment of its own citizens is justified. Traditionally, two theories of punishment have dominated the field: consequentialism and retributivism. According to consequentialism, punishment is justified when it maximizes positive outcomes. According to retributivism, criminals should be punished because they deserve it. This book defends a mixed view that recognizes the strength of both of these intuitions. By this account, the legislature should develop institutional policies and statutory penalties that maintain the social order, that is, consequentialism. It establishes punishment policies to deter criminal activity. By contrast, the criminal judiciary should give individual defendants what they deserve, that is, retributivism and thus expressing the community's appropriate sense of resentment at being wronged. The book justifies the two-tiered model by showing how it accords with our moral intuitions, our assumptions about how what we know affects our moral obligations, and a commonly held theory of freedom. This approach is developed by engaging classic and contemporary work in the philosophy of law, and shows its advantages over competing approaches from contemporary retributivists and other mixed theorists. The work also defends consequentialism against a longstanding objection that the social sciences give us little guidance regarding which policies to adopt. It draws on cutting-edge criminological research to show how punishment theory can help us to address some of our most pressing social issues, including the death penalty, drug laws, and mass incarceration. The book will also be of interest to legal philosophers, social scientists, especially criminologists, sociologists, economists, and political scientists"-- Provided by publisher This book argues for a mixed view of punishment that balances consequentialism and retributivism. It will be of interest to legal philosophers, social scientists, especially criminologists, sociologists, economists, and political scientists. Cover 1 Half Title 2 Series Page 3 Title Page 4 Copyright Page 5 Table of Contents 6 Preface 8 Acknowledgments 10 Introduction 12 Part I Defining punishment 24 Chapter 1 Crimes and burdens 26 Part II Normative foundations 50 Chapter 2 Preserving the public order: A defense of consequentialism 52 Chapter 3 The rational and the reasonable 65 Chapter 4 Expressing resentment: A defense of retributivism 78 Chapter 5 The two-tiered model of punishment 95 Part III Three arguments 130 Chapter 6 The epistemic argument 132 Chapter 7 The compatibilist argument 143 Chapter 8 The moral argument 154 Part IV Decision procedure 166 Chapter 9 In defense of criminology 168 Chapter 10 On proportionality 193 Chapter 11 Jury nullification and reflective equilibrium 206 Part V Applications 222 Chapter 12 Consequences of capital punishment 224 Chapter 13 Retribution and restorative justice 249 Conclusion 266 References 268 Index 303 Legal,Philosophy;,Legal,Theory;,Punishment;,Philosophy,of,Law;,Deterrence,theory;,Retributivism;,Consequentialism;,Separation,of,Powers Legal Philosophy,Legal Theory,Punishment,Philosophy of Law,Deterrence theory,Retributivism,Consequentialism,Separation of Powers