A Theory of Legal Personhood (Oxford Legal Philosophy)

## Abstract Legal personhood is a foundational concept of Western legal thought. It has recently become highly topical, underpinning contemporary debates over the legal status of animals, corporations, foetuses, natural objects, and artificial intelligences. The notion is furthermore crucial in explaining the historical legal statuses of women and slaves. Rather than addressing who or what should be a legal person, this book examines the concept itself. The book consists of an Introduction and three parts. The Introduction presents the Western doctrine of legal personhood, the relevant terms and concepts, and the methodology employed in the book. Part I shows, first, how legal personhood came to be understood synonymously with the holding of legal rights and/or duties. It then subjects this understanding of legal personhood to a rigorous scrutiny, exposing numerous problems afflicting the view. Part II provides a completely new, general theory of legal personhood, arguing that legal personhood is best understood as a cluster property, consisting of distinct incidents. The final part applies the new theory to explain and structure the numerous debates surrounding legal personhood, explaining what is at stake in the animal legal personhood trials taking place in the US and elsewhere. Cover Series A Theory of Legal Personhood Copyright Contents Introduction The Persons of Law Main Tenets of the Proposed Theory Central Features of the Western Doctrine of Legal Personhood Who is a Natural Person? Legal Nonpersons and ‘Things’ The Problems of the Orthodox View Reflective Equilibrium Applying the Reflective Equilibrium to Legal Personhood Personhood and Legal Personhood Value-​Neutrality and the Debate over Rights Book Structure PART I The Orthodox View 1. A Short History of the Right-​Holding Person Preliminaries The Ancient World: Persona as a Role The Early Modern Era: the Birth of the Orthodox View Leibniz and Natural Law: Persons as Subjects of Rights and Duties Kant, Hegel, and the Historical School The Historical School The Influence of German Legal Scholarship in the Anglophone World Conclusion 2. Rights and Persons—​Hohfeldian Analysis Preliminaries Hohfeld’s Analysis Hohfeld and Persons Rights in the Hohfeldian Scheme Legal Persons as Holders of Rights Interest Theory and the Legal Person Will Theory and the Legal Person Can Chattels Hold Rights? Summing Up: Legal Persons as Holders of Rights? Capacity for Rights, Duties, or Legal Relations The Domains of Hohfeldian Categories Legal Nonpersons and Legal Relations Conclusion PART II The Bundle Theory 3. The Incidents of Legal Personhood Preliminaries Legal Personhood as a Cluster Property Passive and Active Incidents Passive Incidents of Legal Personhood Protection of Life, Liberty, and Bodily Integrity: Fundamental Protections Capacity to be a Party to Special Rights Capacity to Own Property, and Not Being Property Standing Capacity to be Legally Harmed Capacity to Count as a Victim Summing Up Active Incidents of Legal Personhood Legal Competences Onerous Legal Personhood Assessing the Bundle Theory Separate or Connected? Legal Person and Subject of Law Persons and Legal Persons 4. Who or What Can be a Legal Person? Rivers, Idols, and Corporations as Legal Persons Two Senses of ‘Legal Person’ The Naming of Legal Platforms Attachment through Claim-​Rights and Acts Passive Legal Personhood Active Legal Personhood Conclusion PART III Applying the Theory 5. Collectivities as Legal Persons Groups and Corporations The Ontology of Group Agents Hohfeld and Groups Powers of Group Agents Claim-​Rights of Group Agents Duties of Group Agents Preliminary Conclusions The Legal Personhood of Collectivities The Alleged Fictionality of Corporations Collectivities as Beneficiaries Conclusion 6. The Legal Personhood of Artificial Intelligences Preliminaries: Three Contexts AIs as Ultimately Valuable AIs as Active Legal Persons Holding AIs Responsible AIs as Commercial Actors AIs and Claim-​Rights Redux Conclusion 7. Legal Personhood in Normative Reasoning Normative Questions Who or What Should be a Legal Person? Legal Personhood in Legal Reasoning Bundle Theory and Animal Personhood Cases ‘Person’ in Legal Nomenclature and Interpretation Finally Bibliography Copyright Acknowledgements Index Who, or what, is a 'person' according to the law? How did this understanding of personhood come about? In the twenty-first century, environmentalism, animal rights, artificial intelligence, and corporate personhood have compelled us to consider these questions once again. Legal personhood is a foundational concept of Western legal thought and A Theory of Legal Personhood seeks to go beyond contemporary debates, challenging our very understanding of legal personhood itself. Drawing on extensive research, scholarship, legislation, and court cases from around the globe, this book offers readers ― with or without previous knowledge ― new insights into legal personhood. It scrutinizes how personhood came to be understood synonymously with the holding of legal rights. It then posits that a better understanding of legal personhood is as a cluster property. Finally, it applies this new theory to explain and structure the numerous debates surrounding legal personhood. Who, or what, is a 'person' according to the law? How did this understanding of personhood come about? In the twenty-first century, environmentalism, animal rights, artificial intelligence, and corporate personhood have compelled us to consider these questions once again. Legal personhood is a foundational concept of Western legal thought and A Theory of Legal Personhood seeks to go beyond contemporary debates, challenging our very understanding of legal personhood itself.0Drawing on extensive research, scholarship, legislation, and court cases from around the globe, this book offers readers - with or without previous knowledge - new insights into legal personhood. It scrutinizes how personhood came to be understood synonymously with the holding of legal rights. It then posits that a better understanding of legal personhood is as a cluster property. Finally, it applies this new theory to explain and structure the numerous debates surrounding legal personhood This work offers a new theory of what it means to be a legal person and suggests that it is best understood as a cluster property. The author explores the origins of legal personhood, the issues afflicting a traditional understanding of the concept, and the numerous debates surrounding the topic This work offers a new theory of what it means to be a legal person and suggests that it is best understood as a cluster property. The book explores the origins of legal personhood, the issues afflicting a traditional understanding of the concept, and the numerous debates surrounding the topic.