A Priori Knowledge: Toward a Phenomenological Explanation (Phenomenology & Mind) (Phenomenology & Mind, 10)

The book sets out to analyze the notion of a priori justification and of a priori knowledge. The most influential explanations of the a priori within the contemporary analytic tradition are analyzed. It is shown that the theories which group around the notion of implicit definition ultimately entail that the propositions which can be known a priori are to be analyzed along conventionalist lines. It is argued that the notion of objective a priori knowledge requires a commitment to the existence of a faculty which is the source of and justifies that kind of knowledge. The existence and functioning of this faculty cannot be explained within a strictly naturalistic set of constraints. Attention to the phenomenology of justification (validation) both of observational and purportedly a priori statements however reveals that the naturalistic demands are based on an asymmetry thesis among perception (and credited genuine sources of justification) and rational insight which is false. Therefore it is argued that a corresponding symmetry thesis must be accepted, according to which rational insight should be regarded as a justification-conferring faculty. In the final part of the book it is argued that Husserl’s conception of the analytic/synthetic distinction, and of concept constitution, allow for an objective interpretation both of analytic and synthetic a priori knowledge. Table of Contents Introduction 1. A Priori, Analyticity,and Implicit Definition Empiricism, Analyticity, and the A Priori Reductive and Non-Reductive Conceptions of Analyticity Implicit Definition, Logical Truth, and the Recalcitrant A Priori Problems with Implicit Definition BonJour’s Objection Fodor and Lepore’s Objection Horwich’s Objection Hale and Wright’s Defence of the Traditional Connection Logic and Convention Coda 2. Realism about Logic Introduction Logical Principles, Justification, and Epistemic Relativity Objective Truth Resnik’s Attack Wittgenstein on the Necessity of “1 inch = 2.54 cm” and Logical Inference Dummett’s Objection Rule Following Considerations and the Adoption of a Convention Summarising Remarks Wright’s Attack Conclusion 3. Objective Knowledge Introduction What the Tortoise Said to Boghossian What Boghossian would say to the Tortoise Rule-circular Arguments The Side-Argument Rejecting the Side-Argument First Horn: Simple Internalism and Rational Insight Second Horn: Epistemic Responsibility and the Lack of EpistemicIrresponsibility Realism, the A priori and Rational Insight Boghossian’s Argument against Relativism Epistemological Realism about Justification Conclusion 4. Phenomenology and Rational Insight Naturalism and Justification Phenomenology, Justification, and Eidetic Seeing Is Holism a Possibility for the Empiricist? Intuition of Essences and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction Husserl’s Conception of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction Eidetic Variation Passive Synthesis and Concept Constitution Knowledge of Reality and Conceptual Truth Absolute vs Relative Objectivity Are Conceptual Truths True? Conclusion References Introduction 1. A Priori, Analyticity, And Implicit Definition Empiricism, Analyticity, And The A Priori Reductive And Non-reductive Conceptions Of Analyticity Implicit Definition, Logical Truth, And The Recalcitrant A Priori Problems With Implicit Definition Bonjour S Objection Fodor And Lepore S Objection Horwich S Objection Hale And Wright S Defence Of The Traditional Connection Logic And Convention Coda 2. Realism About Logic Introduction Logical Principles, Justification And Epistemic Relativity Objective Truth Resnik S Attack Wittgenstein On The Necessity Of 1 Inch = 2.54 Cm And Logical Inference Dummett S Objection Rule Following Considerations And The Adoption Of A Convention Summarising Remarks Wright S Attack 3. Objective Knowledge Introduction What The Tortoise Said To Boghossian What Boghossian Would Say To The Tortoise Rule-circular Arguments The Side-argument Rejecting The Side-argument First Horn: Simple Internalism And Rational Insight Second Horn: Epistemic Responsibility And The Lack Of Epistemic Irresponsibility Realism, The A Priori And Rational Insight Boghossian S Argument Against Relativism Epistemological Realism About Justification Conclusion 4. Phenomenology And Rational Insight Naturalism And Justification Phenomenology, Justification, And Eidetic Seeing Is Holism A Possibility For The Empiricist? Intuition Of Essences And The Analytic/synthetic Distinction Husserl S Conception Of The Analytic/synthetic Distinction Eidetic Variation Passive Synthesis And Concept Constitution Knowledge Of Reality And Conceptual Truth Absolute Vs Relative Objectivity Are Conceptual Truths True? Conclusion References "The book sets out to analyze the notion of a priori justification and of a priori knowledge. The most influential explanations of the a priori within the contemporary analytic tradition are analyzed. It is shown that the theories which group around the notion of implicit definition ultimately entail that the propositions which can be known a priori are to be analyzed along conventionalist lines. It is argued that the notion of objective a priori knowledge requires a commitment to the existence of a faculty which is the source of and justifies that kind of knowledge." "In the final part of the book it is argued that Husserl's conception of the analytic/synthetic distinction, and of concept constitution, allow for an objective interpretation both of analytic and synthetic a priori knowledge."--BOOK JACKET Die Reihe prsentiert Monographien und Sammelbnde zur sterreichischen Philosophie (Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong u.a.) sowie zur Phnomenologie und ihrer Geschichte im Allgemeinen. Phenomenology & Mind bietet darber hinaus ein Publikationsforum fr eine groe Bandbreite unterschiedlicher Forschungsanstze zur Philosophie des Geistes. The series is devoted to monographs and anthologies on Austrian philosophy (Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong and others) as well as on phenomenology and its history in general. Moreover, the series is open to a wide variety of different approaches in the philosophy of mind. Tommaso Piazza. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [185]-193).