A most unlikely God : a philosophical enquiry into the nature of God

The sequel to "From Existence to God", this text offers a portrait of God that contrasts sharply with that provided by perfect-being theology. It exposes the absurdity of this view and shows how radically God differs from even the most exalted of his creatures. A Most Unlikely God Contents Preface 1— Discordant Views of God's Nature Perfect-Being Theology Negative Theology Notions of Limit Simpliciter and Limit Case Divine Simplicity 2— Existence I— '____Exists' Is Sometimes a First-Level Predicable II— The Misconception Underlying Opposition to '____Exists' Ever Being a First-Level Predicable III— Conclusion 3— The Reality and Wealth of Existence The Relation of Socrates to His Existence Inherence of Properties: Existence vs. Wisdom Individuation without Inherence Socrates the Bound = Socrates the Individual The Reality of Existence Revisited The Wealth of Existence The Wealth of Existence A Corollary Concerning'____ exists' The 'On/Off Character' of Existence Illustrating the Bound/Bounded Relation Conclusion Appendix 1— Individuals Are Inconceivable before They Exist Argument for Premiss (3.11): Argument for Premiss (3.12): II— Property Instances Predicates As Undetachable Expressions Predicate Sense The Existence of Predicate Instances Objections to Predicate Instances 4— Subsistent Existence: An Identity of Limit Cases The Notion of Subsistent Existence Are Limit Cases Relevant to Instances of Existence? The Limit Case Instance of Existence Only One Limit Case Instance of Existence Subsistent Existence As an Identity of Limit Cases Misleading Notions of Subsistent Existence The Ontological Richness of Subsistent Existence Reason for the Ontological Wealth of Subsistent Existence In What the Wealth of Subsistent Existence Consists Objections Whether Subsistent Existence Is Unintelligible Whether Subsistent Existence Would Be a Property Instance If Subsistent Existence, Then No Creatures? Conclusion 5— Subsistent Existence and Its Non-Existential Properties Which Attributes Are Divine? The Perfect-Being Account Vs. The Limit Case Account A Common Strategy for Determining the Divine Attributes Omnipotence Knowing Intellection Conclusion 6— Further Insights into the Divine Nature 1— Divine Cognition What Omniscience Does Not Imply The Divine Cognitive State Is Contingent No Lacuna in God's Knowledge II— Divine Willing Freedom—but No Choice—in a Simple God Creating Adds Nothing to God: It Is Merely a Cambridge Property Conclusion Appendix: Further Objections to the Simplicity Doctrine Is God Dependent on Properties? Is God a Property Instance? Simplicity and the Paradox of Perfection Can God Have Only One Essential Attribute? Can God Have Unique Properties? How Can God's Properties Be Co-extensive? How Can Different Properties Be Identical in God? God and Absolute Perfection 7— Divine Simplicity and Human Freedom Divine Foreknowledge without Divine Causation Molinism Quasi-Molinism Leftow's Second Option Flaws in These Theories Divine Causation The Radical Difference between Divine and Creaturely Causation The Relation between Divine and Creaturely Causation The Role of God as First Cause Even Free Actions are Caused by God Is God to Blame for Human Evil? God's Foreknowledge of Free Acts Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom Conclusion 8— God-Talk about a Simple God Why the Divine Simplicity Appears to Be a Problem for God-Talk Complex Propositions for a Simple God Argument for Analogical God-Talk Replies to Previous Difficulties Conclusion Appendix Simple Propositions for a Simple God 9— A Most Unlikely God Making Sense of the Simplicity Doctrine Pure Actuality—A Most Unlikely God God's Actions Ad Extra What If God Had Not Created the Universe? Freedom without Choice God's Willing and Knowing5 Conclusion lndex A B C D E F G H I K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Z About the Author