A Metaphysics of Psychopathology (Philosophical Psychopathology)

In psychiatry, few question the legitimacy of asking whether a given psychiatric disorder is real; similarly, in psychology, scholars debate the reality of such theoretical entities as general intelligence, superegos, and personality traits. And yet in both disciplines, little thought is given to what is meant by the rather abstract philosophical concept of "real." Indeed, certain psychiatric disorders have passed from real to imaginary (as in the case of multiple personality disorder) and from imaginary to real (as in the case of post-traumatic stress disorder). In this book, Peter Zachar considers such terms as "real" and "reality" -- invoked in psychiatry but often obscure and remote from their instances -- as abstract philosophical concepts. He then examines the implications of his approach for psychiatric classification and psychopathology. Proposing what he calls a scientifically inspired pragmatism, Zachar considers such topics as the essentialist bias, diagnostic literalism, and the concepts of natural kind and social construct. Turning explicitly to psychiatric topics, he proposes a new model for the domain of psychiatric disorders, the imperfect community model, which avoids both relativism and essentialism. He uses this model to understand such recent controversies as the attempt to eliminate narcissistic personality disorder from the DSM-5. Returning to such concepts as real, true, and objective, Zachar argues that not only should we use these metaphysical concepts to think philosophically about other concepts, we should think philosophically about them. An exploration of what it means to think about psychiatric disorders as "real," "true," and "objective" and the implications for classification and diagnosis. In psychiatry, few question the legitimacy of asking whether a given psychiatric disorder is real; similarly, in psychology, scholars debate the reality of such theoretical entities as general intelligence, superegos, and personality traits. And yet in both disciplines, little thought is given to what is meant by the rather abstract philosophical concept of "real." Indeed, certain psychiatric disorders have passed from real to imaginary (as in the case of multiple personality disorder) and from imaginary to real (as in the case of post-traumatic stress disorder). In this book, Peter Zachar considers such terms as "real" and "reality"--invoked in psychiatry but often obscure and remote from their instances--as abstract philosophical concepts. He then examines the implications of his approach for psychiatric classification and psychopathology. Proposing what he calls a scientifically inspired pragmatism, Zachar considers such topics as the essentialist bias, diagnostic literalism, and the concepts of natural kind and social construct. Turning explicitly to psychiatric topics, he proposes a new model for the domain of psychiatric disorders, the imperfect community model, which avoids both relativism and essentialism. He uses this model to understand such recent controversies as the attempt to eliminate narcissistic personality disorder from the DSM-5. Returning to such concepts as real, true, and objective, Zachar argues that not only should we use these metaphysical concepts to think philosophically about other concepts, we should think philosophically about them. In psychiatry, few question the legitimacy of asking whether a given psychiatric disorder is real; similarly, in psychology, scholars debate the reality of such theoretical entities as general intelligence, superegos, and personality traits. And yet in both disciplines, little thought is given to what is meant by the rather abstract philosophical concept of "real." Indeed, certain psychiatric disorders have passed from real to imaginary (as in the case of multiple personality disorder) and from imaginary to real (as in the case of post-traumatic stress disorder). In this book, Peter Zachar considers such terms as "real" and "reality" -- invoked in psychiatry but often obscure and remote from their instances -- as abstract philosophical concepts. He then examines the implications of his approach for psychiatric classification and psychopathology. Proposing what he calls a scientifically inspired pragmatism, Zachar considers such topics as the essentialist bias, diagnostic literalism, and the concepts of natural kind and social construct. Turning explicitly to psychiatric topics, he proposes a new model for the domain of psychiatric disorders, the __imperfect community__ model, which avoids both relativism and essentialism. He uses this model to understand such recent controversies as the attempt to eliminate narcissistic personality disorder from the DSM-5. Returning to such concepts as real, true, and objective, Zachar argues that not only should we use these metaphysical concepts to think philosophically about other concepts, we should think philosophically about them. Introduction: Psychiatry, Science Wars, And The Problem Of Realism -- A Scientifically-inspired Pragmatism -- Instrumental Nominalism -- Psychological And Scientific Essentialism -- Misplaced Literalism -- Literalism And The Distrust Of Authority -- The Objective Within, Not Beyond, Experience -- Classification And The Concept Of Psychiatric Disorder -- Four Conceptual Abstractions: Natural Kind, Historical Concept, Normative Concept And Practical Kind -- Can Grief Really Be A Disorder? -- Is Narcissistic Personality Disorder Real? -- Psychiatry, Progress, And Thinking Philosophically About Philosophical Concepts. Peter Zachar. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Mode Of Access: World Wide Web. Contents 8 Preface and Acknowledgments 10 1 Introduction: Science Wars, Psychiatry, and the Problem of Realism 14 2 A Scientifically Inspired Pragmatism 36 3 Instrumental Nominalism 54 4 Psychological and Scientific Essentialism 68 5 Misplaced Literalism 86 6 Literalism and the Distrust of Authority 98 7 The Objective Within, Not Beyond, Experience 112 8 Classification and the Concept of Psychiatric Disorder 128 9 Four Conceptual Abstractions: Natural Kind, Historical Concept, Normative Concept, and Practical Kind 150 10 Can Grief Really Be a Disorder? 170 11 Is Narcissistic Personality Disorder Real? 194 12 Psychiatry, Progress, and Metaphysics 216 Notes 244 Glossary 250 References 254 Index 284 Content: Introduction: psychiatry, science wars, and the problem of realism -- A scientifically-inspired pragmatism -- Instrumental nominalism -- Psychological and scientific essentialism -- Misplaced literalism -- Literalism and the distrust of authority -- The objective within, not beyond, experience -- Classification and the concept of psychiatric disorder -- Four conceptual abstractions: natural kind, historical concept, normative concept and practical kind -- Can grief really be a disorder? -- Is narcissistic personality disorder real? -- Psychiatry, progress, and thinking philosophically about philosophical concepts.