A Defense Of Abortion (cambridge Studies In Philosophy And Public Policy)

There are already a couple of good reviews to this book, so I will only add that it is extremely easy to follow and in order to savour it one only needs to be a curious layperson. So my rate is 5 (content) and 3 (pleasure). I also suggest reading the following readable books dealing with ethical /philosophical matters in addition to Boonin's interesting book: a) "Justice. What's the right thing to do" by Michael Sandel; b) "The God Question: What Famous Thinkers from Plato to Dawkins Have Said About the Divine" by Andrew Pessin; c) "Hegel" by Terry Pinkard; d) "The proper study of mankind" by Isaiah Berlin; and e) "Illness as Metaphor and AIDS and Its Metaphors" by Susan Sontag. Other interesting books, but no so readable would be the following: 1) "Moral Measures: An Introduction to Ethics West and East" by James Tiles; 2) "Ética como amor propio" by Fernando Savater; 3)"The Shape of Ancient Thought: Comparative Studies in Greek and Indian Philosophies" by Thomas McEvilley; and 4) "Schopenhauer and the Wild Years of Philosophy" by Rüdiger Safranksi. Cover......Page 1 Half-title......Page 3 Series-title......Page 5 Title......Page 7 Copyright......Page 8 Dedication......Page 9 Contents......Page 11 Preface......Page 15 Acknowledgments......Page 17 1.0. OVERVIEW......Page 19 1.1.1. Framing the Question......Page 21 1.1.2. Three Objections......Page 24 1.2.1. Reflective Equilibrium......Page 27 1.2.2. Reflective Equilibrium and Abortion......Page 31 1.3.1. The Rights-Based Argument......Page 32 1.3.2. Non-Rights-Based Arguments......Page 36 2.0. OVERVIEW......Page 37 2.1. THE PARSIMONY ARGUMENT......Page 38 2.2. THE SPECIES ESSENCE ARGUMENT......Page 41 2.3. THE KINDRED SPECIES ARGUMENT......Page 44 2.4. THE SANCTITY OF HUMAN LIFE ARGUMENT......Page 45 2.5. THE SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENT......Page 51 2.6. THE POTENTIALITY ARGUMENT......Page 63 2.7. THE ESSENTIAL PROPERTY ARGUMENT......Page 67 2.8. THE FUTURE-LIKE-OURS ARGUMENT......Page 74 2.8.1. The Argument......Page 75 2.8.2. The Challenge......Page 80 2.8.3. Occurrent versus Dispositional Desires......Page 82 2.8.4. Actual versus Ideal Desires......Page 88 2.8.5. Implications......Page 97 2.9. THE PROBABILITY ARGUMENT......Page 103 3.0. OVERVIEW......Page 109 3.1. IMPLANTATION......Page 110 3.2. EXTERNAL HUMAN FORM......Page 113 3.3. ACTUAL FETAL MOVEMENT......Page 115 3.5. INITIAL BRAIN ACTIVITY......Page 116 3.5.1. The Brain......Page 117 3.5.2. The Cerebral Cortex......Page 120 3.5.3. The Initial Brain Activity Criterion......Page 122 3.5.4. The Symmetry Argument......Page 130 3.6.1. The Proposal......Page 133 3.6.2. Rival Arguments......Page 134 3.6.3. The Modified Future-Like-Ours Argument......Page 140 3.6.4. The Gray Area......Page 145 3.7. VIABILITY......Page 147 4.0. OVERVIEW......Page 151 4.1. THE ARGUMENT......Page 153 4.2. THE WEIRDNESS OBJECTION......Page 157 4.3.1. Consent versus Responsibility......Page 166 4.3.2. The Significance of the Objection......Page 168 4.3.3. The Objection’s Two Claims......Page 171 4.3.4. Rejecting the First Claim......Page 172 4.3.5. Rejecting the Second Claim......Page 182 4.4. THE RESPONSIBILITY OBJECTION......Page 185 4.4.1. Two Senses of Responsibility......Page 186 4.4.2. The Significance of the Distinction......Page 190 4.4.3. Three Objections......Page 193 4.5.1. The Objection......Page 206 4.5.2. Letting the Fetus Die......Page 211 4.5.3. Killing the Fetus......Page 217 4.5.4. Two Objections......Page 222 4.6.1. The Objection......Page 230 4.6.2. Intentionally Letting the Fetus Die......Page 233 4.6.3. Intentionally Killing the Fetus......Page 239 4.7. THE STRANGER VERSUS OFFSPRING OBJECTION......Page 245 4.8. THE ADULT VERSUS INFANT OBJECTION......Page 252 4.9. THE DIFFERENT BURDENS OBJECTION......Page 254 4.10. THE ORGAN OWNERSHIP OBJECTION......Page 260 4.11.THE CHILD SUPPORT OBJECTION......Page 264 4.12. THE EXTRACTION VERSUS ABORTION OBJECTION......Page 272 4.13. THE THIRD-PARTY OBJECTION......Page 278 4.14. THE FEMINIST OBJECTION......Page 280 4.14.1. The Ignoring Patriarchy Version......Page 281 4.14.2. The Selfishness Version......Page 283 4.15. THE DUTY TO SA VE THE VIOLINIST OBJECTION......Page 284 4.15.1. The Conscription Version......Page 285 4.15.2. The Involuntary Samaritan Version......Page 286 4.15.3. The Justification versus Excuse Version......Page 287 4.15.4. The Consequentialist Version......Page 289 4.16. THE COMPENSATION OBJECTION......Page 291 4.17. THE INCONSISTENCY OBJECTION......Page 292 4.18. SOME PUZZLES RESOLVED......Page 294 5.0. OVERVIEW......Page 300 5.1. THE GOLDEN RULE ARGUMENT......Page 301 5.1.1. Hare’s Version......Page 302 5.1.2. Gensler’s Version......Page 307 5.2. THE CULTURE OF DEATH ARGUMENT......Page 316 5.3. THE PRO-LIFE FEMINIST ARGUMENT......Page 318 5.4. THE UNCERTAINTY ARGUMENT......Page 328 5.4.1. Three Versions of the Argument......Page 330 5.4.2. Three Objections......Page 332 Bibliography......Page 343 Index......Page 363 Cover 1 Half-title 3 Series-title 5 Title 7 Copyright 8 Dedication 9 Contents 11 Preface 15 Acknowledgments 17 Chapter 1 Framing the Debate 19 1.0. OVERVIEW 19 1.1. THE QUESTION 21 1.1.1. Framing the Question 21 1.1.2. Three Objections 24 1.2. THE METHOD 27 1.2.1. Reflective Equilibrium 27 1.2.2. Reflective Equilibrium and Abortion 31 1.3. THE ARGUMENTS 32 1.3.1. The Rights-Based Argument 32 1.3.2. Non-Rights-Based Arguments 36 Chapter 2 The Conception Criterion 37 2.0. OVERVIEW 37 2.1. THE PARSIMONY ARGUMENT 38 2.2. THE SPECIES ESSENCE ARGUMENT 41 2.3. THE KINDRED SPECIES ARGUMENT 44 2.4. THE SANCTITY OF HUMAN LIFE ARGUMENT 45 2.5. THE SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENT 51 2.6. THE POTENTIALITY ARGUMENT 63 2.7. THE ESSENTIAL PROPERTY ARGUMENT 67 2.8. THE FUTURE-LIKE-OURS ARGUMENT 74 2.8.1. The Argument 75 2.8.2. The Challenge 80 2.8.3. Occurrent versus Dispositional Desires 82 2.8.4. Actual versus Ideal Desires 88 2.8.5. Implications 97 2.9. THE PROBABILITY ARGUMENT 103 Chapter 3 Postconception Criteria 109 3.0. OVERVIEW 109 3.1. IMPLANTATION 110 3.2. EXTERNAL HUMAN FORM 113 3.3. ACTUAL FETAL MOVEMENT 115 3.4. PERCEIVED FETAL MOVEMENT (QUICKENING) 116 3.5. INITIAL BRAIN ACTIVITY 116 3.5.1. The Brain 117 3.5.2. The Cerebral Cortex 120 3.5.3. The Initial Brain Activity Criterion 122 3.5.4. The Symmetry Argument 130 3.6. ORGANIZED CORTICAL BRAIN ACTIVITY 133 3.6.1. The Proposal 133 3.6.2. Rival Arguments 134 3.6.3. The Modified Future-Like-Ours Argument 140 3.6.4. The Gray Area 145 3.7. VIABILITY 147 Chapter 4 The Good Samaritan Argument 151 4.0. OVERVIEW 151 4.1. THE ARGUMENT 153 4.2. THE WEIRDNESS OBJECTION 157 4.3. THE TACIT CONSENT OBJECTION 166 4.3.1. Consent versus Responsibility 166 4.3.2. The Significance of the Objection 168 4.3.3. The Objection’s Two Claims 171 4.3.4. Rejecting the First Claim 172 4.3.5. Rejecting the Second Claim 182 4.4. THE RESPONSIBILITY OBJECTION 185 4.4.1. Two Senses of Responsibility 186 4.4.2. The Significance of the Distinction 190 4.4.3. Three Objections 193 4.5. THE KILLING VERSUS LETTING DIE OBJECTION 206 4.5.1. The Objection 206 4.5.2. Letting the Fetus Die 211 4.5.3. Killing the Fetus 217 4.5.4. Two Objections 222 4.6. THE INTENDING VERSUS FORESEEING OBJECTION 230 4.6.1. The Objection 230 4.6.2. Intentionally Letting the Fetus Die 233 4.6.3. Intentionally Killing the Fetus 239 4.7. THE STRANGER VERSUS OFFSPRING OBJECTION 245 4.8. THE ADULT VERSUS INFANT OBJECTION 252 4.9. THE DIFFERENT BURDENS OBJECTION 254 4.10. THE ORGAN OWNERSHIP OBJECTION 260 4.11.THE CHILD SUPPORT OBJECTION 264 4.12. THE EXTRACTION VERSUS ABORTION OBJECTION 272 4.13. THE THIRD-PARTY OBJECTION 278 4.14. THE FEMINIST OBJECTION 280 4.14.1. The Ignoring Patriarchy Version 281 4.14.2. The Selfishness Version 283 4.15. THE DUTY TO SA VE THE VIOLINIST OBJECTION 284 4.15.1. The Conscription Version 285 4.15.2. The Involuntary Samaritan Version 286 4.15.3. The Justification versus Excuse Version 287 4.15.4. The Consequentialist Version 289 4.16. THE COMPENSATION OBJECTION 291 4.17. THE INCONSISTENCY OBJECTION 292 4.18. SOME PUZZLES RESOLVED 294 Chapter 5 Non-Rights-Based Arguments 300 5.0. OVERVIEW 300 5.1. THE GOLDEN RULE ARGUMENT 301 5.1.1. Hare’s Version 302 5.1.2. Gensler’s Version 307 5.2. THE CULTURE OF DEATH ARGUMENT 316 5.3. THE PRO-LIFE FEMINIST ARGUMENT 318 5.4. THE UNCERTAINTY ARGUMENT 328 5.4.1. Three Versions of the Argument 330 5.4.2. Three Objections 332 Bibliography 343 Index 363 David Boonin Has Written The Most Thorough And Detailed Case For The Moral Permissibility Of Abortion Yet Published. Critically Examining A Wide Range Of Arguments That Attempt To Prove That Every Human Fetus Has A Right To Life, He Shows That Each Of These Arguments Fails On Its Own Terms. He Then Explains How Even If The Fetus Does Have A Right To Life, Abortion Can Still Be Shown To Be Morally Permissible On The Critic Of Abortion's Own Terms. Finally, He Considers Several Arguments Against Abortion That Do Not Depend On The Claim That The Fetus Has A Right In Life - Arguments Based On The Golden Rule, On Principles Of Uncertainty Or On Various Feminist Theories - And Concludes That These, Too, Are Ultimately Unsuccessful. This Major Book Will Be Especially Helpful To Those Teaching Applied Ethics And Bioethics Whether In Philosophy Departments Or Professional Schools Of Law And Medicine. It Will Also Interest Students Of Women's Studies As Well As All General Readers For Whom Abortion Remains A High-profile And Complex Issue.--jacket. Framing The Debate -- Framing The Question -- Three Objections -- The Method -- Reflective Equilibrium -- Reflective Equilibrium And Abortion -- The Arguments -- The Rights-based Argument -- Non-rights-based Arguments -- The Conception Criterion -- The Parsimony Argument -- The Species Essence Argument -- The Kindred Species Argument -- The Sanctity Of Human Life Argument -- The Slippery Slope Argument -- The Potentiality Argument -- The Essential Property Argument -- The Future-like-ours Argument -- The Argument -- The Challenge -- Occurrent Versus Dispositional Desires -- Actual Versus Ideal Desires -- Implications -- The Probability Argument -- Postconception Criteria -- Implantation -- External Human Form -- Actual Fetal Movement -- Perceived Fetal Movement (quickening) -- Initial Brain Activity -- The Brain -- The Cerebral Cortex -- The Initial Brain Activity Criterion -- The Symmetry Argument -- Organized Cortical Brain Activity -- The Proposal -- Rival Arguments -- The Modified Future-like-ours Argument -- The Gray Area -- Viability -- The Good Samaritan Argument -- The Weirdness Objection -- The Tacit Consent Objection -- Consent Versus Responsibility -- The Significance Of The Objection -- The Objection's Two Claims -- Rejecting The First Claim -- Rejecting The Second Claim -- The Responsibility Objection -- Two Senses Of Responsibility -- The Significance Of The Distinction -- Three Objections -- The Killing Versus Letting Die Objection -- Letting The Fetus Die -- Killing The Fetus -- Two Objections. David Boonin. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 325-343) And Index.

The central thesis of philosopher David Boonin is that the moral case against abortion can be shown to be unsuccessful on terms that critics of abortion can and do accept. Critically examining a wide array of arguments that have attempted to establish that every human fetus has a right to life, Boonin posits that all of these arguments fail on their own terms. He then argues that even if the fetus does have a right to life, abortion can still be shown to be morally permissible on the critic of abortion's own terms. Finally, Boonin considers a number of arguments against abortion that do not depend on the claim that the fetus has a right to life, including those based on the golden rule, considerations of uncertainty and a commitment to certain feminist principles, and asserts that these positions, too, are ultimately unsuccessful. The result is the most thorough and detailed case for the moral permissibility of abortion that has yet been written. David Boonin is professor of philosophy at the University of Colorado. He is the author of Thomas Hobbes and the Science of Moral Virtue (Cambridge, 1994).

David Boonin has written the most thorough and detailed case for the moral permissibility of abortion yet published. Critically examining a wide range of arguments that attempt to prove that every human fetus has a right to life, he shows that each of these arguments fails on its own terms. He then explains how even if the fetus does have a right to life, abortion can still be shown to be morally permissible on the critique of abortion's own terms. Finally he considers several pro-life arguments that do not depend on claims that the fetus has a right to life and concludes that these too are ultimately unsuccessful. This major book will be especially helpful to those teaching applied ethics and bioethics in philosophy departments or professional schools of law and medicine. It will interest students of women studies and general readers for whom abortion remains a high-profile issue. David Boonin has written the most thorough and detailed case for the moral permissibility of abortion yet published. This major book will be especially helpful to those teaching applied ethics and bioethics in philosophy or in law and medicine and to general readers for whom abortion remains a high-profile issue