A Critical Assessment of Contemporary Cosmological Arguments: Towards a Renewed Case for Theism

Towards a Renewed Case for Theism Contents Acknowledgements Introduction A resurgence of metaphysics Structure of this thesis Ontological framework Methodology An initial objection Traditional cosmological arguments: two paradigmatic forms Introduction The first paradigmatic form Premise (1) Premise (2) Premise (3) Premise (7) Premise (9) Evaluation The second paradigmatic form Premise (1*) Premise (3) Premise (4) Premise (7) Premise (9) Evaluation Closing remarks The cosmological argument of Koons Introduction Background The argument Objections Objections discussed and criticized by Koons The classical Humean, Kantian and Russellian objections The objections from quantum mechanics and libertarian freedom The objections from infinite regress The objection that, typically, effects have contingent causes The multi-verse objection The objection that asks where the cause of the cosmos came from A new objection: the cause of the aggregate of all wholly contingents is not a first cause Closing remarks The cosmological argument of Gale and Pruss Introduction Background The argument Objections Objections discussed and rebutted by Gale and Pruss (1999) The classical Humean objection The objection that q is not self-explaining The objection that the actual world’s Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact is unexplainable The objection that an essentially free and necessarily existing being is impossible The objection that the cosmos is caused by blind indeterministic mechanical causation The objection that the weak version of the principle of sufficient reason begs the question Summary Objections raised by Graham Oppy The objection that Leibniz’s weak version is no advance since it implies the strong one The objection that the new argument fails since Leibniz’s strong principle does not hold The objection that we are justified only to say that Leibniz’s weak principle is nearly true The objection that the abstract propositions employed beg the question or are unclear Summary Objections raised by Davey and Clifton The objection that, necessarily, the conjunction of all contingent truths is unexplainable The objection that we have no authority to infer that, possibly, the BCCF is explainable The objection that the weak version of Leibniz’s principle violates our modal intuitions Summary Objections raised by Almeida and Judisch Summary Further objections The possibility of an infinite downward regress within the proposition q is not excluded A being that brings all contingent things into existence itself violates libertarian theory Closing remarks Cosmological arguments of Rasmussen Introduction The argument from a maximal contingent state of existence Background framework The argument An assessment An assessment of Rasmussen’s case for accepting the first premise An assessment of Rasmussen’s case for accepting the second premise An assessment of Rasmussen’s case for accepting the third premise Assessing objections to the new cosmological argument discussed by Rasmussen himself Does Rasmussen’s new cosmological argument qualify as an adequate first cause argument? Three additional alternative paths to the existence of a concrete necessary being The path from it being possible to explain why there is at least one concrete contingent object The path from it being possible to explain why there are exactly n concrete contingent objects The path from it being possible that there is a first caused contingent concrete particular Closing remarks Atomism, causalism and the existence of a first cause Introduction Stage setting Parthood and composition Supplementation Composition-as-Identity The argument First step: every caused composite contains a caused simple Second step: the sum of all caused simples (called M) is an object Third step: M is not a cause Fourth step: the cause of M (called A) is uncaused Fifth step: A is a first cause In defense of the premises Premise (1): there are objects Premise (2): every composite object is ultimately composed of simple objects Premise (3): every object is caused or is the cause of one or more other objects Premise (4): the sum of all caused simple objects, if not empty, is an object Premise (5): the cause of an object is disjoint with that object Premise (6): every caused composite object contains a caused proper part Closing remarks A critical assessment of the argument from causalism and atomism Introduction Objections discussed as part of the traditional Thomistic and Leibnizian arguments Objections discussed as part of the arguments of Koons, Gale & Pruss, and Rasmussen Objections from Hume, Kant and Russell Objections related to Koons’ argument Objections related to Gale and Pruss’s argument Objections related to Rasmussen’s arguments Objections specifically addressing the new argument’s framework or premises The objection that the underlying framework of the new argument is too restrictive The objection that the 2nd premise is insufficient to complete the new argument’s first step The objection that the sum of all caused simples is not prior to every caused object The objection that the new argument’s entailed first cause does not have to be a ‘unity’ Objections addressing the new argument’s notion of causation or its causal principles Conclusions and further work Introduction An inherent limitation of cosmological arguments Two further, more fundamental, problems Is the new argument incompatible with theism? Is there a tension between the framework’s generic nature and its specific defense? The case for theism Implications of the new cosmological argument Arguments for a personal first cause A deep linkage between the nature of cognition and the nature of reality An order of value of types of existents within which everything that exists participates The implications of the idea that reality is ultimately metaphysically intelligible #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 #7 #8 #9 #10 Samenvatting References Curriculum Vitæ